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Independent Yet Captured: Compensation
Committee Independence After Dodd-Frank
Bernice Grant*
In response to the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 includes several far-reaching executive
compensation reforms. Because most scholars have focused on the so-called “say-onpay” provision, they have not sufficiently analyzed another Dodd-Frank reform that
requires public companies to have compensation committees composed entirely of
independent directors. This Article fills that void. Although it is sensible to make
compensation committee members independent of management, the reform does not go
far enough to achieve its goal. The independence requirement is not sufficient to prevent
directors from being captured by management because it does not take into account
organizational behavior literature regarding group dynamics. Ostensibly independent
directors might still be subject to organizational behavior factors—such as norms of
reciprocity, groupthink, polarization, social cascades, and herding—that could lead them
to approve excessive compensation packages.
This Article thus proposes two additional reforms to augment the independence of
compensation committee members: (1) mandatory continuing professional education
regarding compensation issues and (2) a rotation system for compensation committee
membership. Directors will be less susceptible to the organizational behavior factors
noted above if they are equipped with knowledge about complex compensation issues
and tasked with approving compensation for only a limited period of time. These
recommendations draw on similar requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
which mandate that (1) all members of the audit committee be financially literate, (2) at
least one audit committee member have financial expertise, and (3) the lead and
concurring partners of a company’s auditing firm rotate off the client engagement after
five years.
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Introduction
Millions of Americans lost their jobs, their homes, and, moreover,
their belief in the American dream during the financial crisis of 2008 to
2009. This despair was exacerbated by reports that executives of
prominent financial institutions were receiving high amounts of
compensation, even as the companies they led were failing and, in some
cases, being bailed out by the federal government using taxpayer dollars.
Many critics voiced concern that the magnitude and design of executive
compensation at financial institutions and other large companies played
1
a critical role in causing the financial crisis. Eventually, public outrage
over executive compensation reached a boiling point, which led Congress
to consider reforms to improve executive compensation specifically, and
2
corporate governance more generally.
In response to such concerns, when Congress enacted the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
in July of 2010, it included several far-reaching executive compensation
3
reforms. Indeed, one author stated that “[t]aken together, the provisions
in Dodd-Frank that affect the executive pay process quite arguably will
have the broadest and most significant impact on the pay process of any
4
set of new rules ever contained in one law.”
The most prominent executive compensation reform is the so-called
“say-on-pay” provision, which gives shareholders of U.S. public companies
5
a nonbinding, advisory vote on executive compensation. While scholars
6
have extensively analyzed that provision, they have not sufficiently
analyzed another important executive compensation provision: the
requirement that U.S. public companies have a compensation committee
composed entirely of independent directors. This Article ventures into

1. See, e.g., Jay Lorsch & Rakesh Khurana, The Pay Problem, Harv. Mag., May–June 2010, at 30.
2. See, e.g., Compensation in the Financial Industry: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
U.S. H.R., 111th Cong., Serial No. 111-98 (2010).
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, §§ 951–54 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
4. See Joseph E. Bachelder III, Dodd-Frank Provisions Affecting Executive Pay, Harv. L. Sch.
F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Oct. 5, 2010, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2010/10/05/dodd-frank-provisions-affecting-executive-pay; see also Aon Hewitt, Conference
Committee Issues Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive
Compensation Alert, June 29, 2010, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.aon.com/attachments/
thought-leadership/executive_compensation_alerts/ ECA_2010_03v2.pdf (“Of the over 2,000 pages,
less than 25 pages apply to executive compensation and corporate governance. However, those few
pages have a major effect.”).
5. Dodd-Frank Act § 951(a).
6. See, e.g., Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 36 Del.
J. Corp. L. 417 (2011); Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will it Lead to a Greater
Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1213, 1226 (2012).
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this void by critiquing that reform and proposing additional reforms for
7
increased efficacy.
The compensation committee of a company’s board of directors
approves the compensation of the company’s top executives. The
compensation committee independence requirement is intended to
diminish conflicts of interest that can occur when the compensation
committee is “captured” and thus lacks the independence and objectivity
that is necessary to determine executive compensation in an arm’s length
fashion. The term “captured board” refers to a board that is serving the
8
interests of management rather than shareholders.
While it is sensible to increase the compensation committee’s
independence from management, the reform does not go far enough
because it fails to take into account relevant insights from organizational
behavior literature regarding group dynamics. Directors who are
nominally independent from management might still be subject to
organizational behavior factors such as norms of reciprocity, groupthink,
polarization, social cascades, and herding, which can lead them to approve
excessive executive compensation packages.
To counteract this issue, this Article proposes two reforms:
(1) continuing professional education regarding compensation issues for
compensation committee members and (2) implementing a rotation
system for compensation committee members, or at least the chairperson.
The first reform—continuing education—should be mandatory, but the
second reform—rotation system—should be recommended for companies
9
that have a sufficient number of independent directors on their boards.
The rationale for this proposal is that directors will be less susceptible
to the organizational behavior factors described above if they are
knowledgeable about compensation issues and are tasked with approving
compensation for only a limited period of time. These recommendations
draw on similar features of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SarbanesOxley”) that require (1) financial literacy of all members of the audit
committee, (2) financial expertise of at least one audit committee
member, and (3) the lead engagement partner and concurring partner of
a company’s independent auditors to rotate off the engagement after a
10
fixed period of time.
This Article contributes to the existing scholarly literature by
developing and modernizing reforms that practitioners considered in
connection with Sarbanes-Oxley, grounding the reforms in organizational

7. Some scholars have analyzed the compensation committee independence requirement, but in
general, the articles are primarily descriptive rather than prescriptive. See discussion infra Parts II–III.
8. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance 65 (2008).
9. See discussion infra Subpart III.C.2.b.
10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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behavior theory to provide a scholarly framework, and applying these
adaptations to the compensation committee requirements of DoddFrank. From a broader standpoint, this Article highlights some of the
ways in which organizational behavior theory affects the actions of
corporate boards, executives, and shareholders. It also illustrates why
regulatory reform in the corporate governance field must take such
organizational behavior factors into account. The Article focuses on
executive compensation, which many scholars regard as the primary issue
11
in corporate governance. However, the organizational behavior issues
described herein have broader implications for other aspects of corporate
governance, such as corporate social responsibility.
Part I of this Article describes the scholarly debate concerning
executive compensation and the resulting Dodd-Frank reforms. Part II
explores organizational behavior literature regarding group dynamics of
boards and discusses insights from that literature that affect the
compensation-setting process. Finally, Part III critiques the compensation
committee independence requirement, proposes two additional reforms
that draw on the insights from Part II, and provides a comparative law
perspective.

I. Executive Compensation Reforms in Dodd-Frank
As noted above, this Part describes the background that led to the
executive compensation reforms in Dodd-Frank and provides further
detail regarding such reforms.
A. Scholarly Debate Concerning Executive Compensation
In response to the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009, President Obama
signed Dodd-Frank into law on July 21, 2010. Dodd-Frank aimed to
“promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to
fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
12
purposes.” Dodd-Frank also reformed executive compensation and
corporate governance, responding to the perception that these issues
played a role in causing the financial crisis.
As a threshold matter, there is room for debate as to whether the
magnitude and/or the design of executive compensation played a role in
the financial crisis and, as a corollary, whether further regulation of

11. Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 Wm. & Mary Bus. L.
Rev. 1, 3 (2013) (quoting NECA-IBEW Pension Fund ex rel. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Cox, No. 1:110451, 2011 WL 4383368, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2011)).
12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, pmbl (2010).
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executive compensation was needed. There is significant disagreement
among scholars over whether executive compensation is, in fact, excessive
and/or inappropriately designed. While this Article does not seek to
resolve such debate, it summarizes some of the arguments and provides
compensation data for the period up to the financial crisis in 2008 to
provide the necessary background for evaluating the resulting reforms.
1. Compensation Amount
The debate over executive compensation concerns both the amount
of compensation and the design of compensation. Various critics have
argued that the amount of executive compensation has risen to excessive
levels, and that this played a role in the financial crisis. For example, Paul
Volcker, the former chair of the Federal Reserve, blamed “excessive pay
13
packages” for the failing financial markets in 2008. As it is difficult to
prove empirically that executive compensation is “excessive,” the
literature in support of this claim usually relies on indirect evidence. Some
scholars argue, for example, that the dramatic rise in CEO pay in
14
comparison to the average worker’s pay is evidence of income inequality.
These scholars also devised a formula indicating that pay is excessive to
the extent that it exceeds the amount of pay attributable to a CEO’s
15
ability, effort, and a risk premium.
Indeed, the gap between the pay of CEOs and that of other
employees has expanded dramatically. For example, in 1980 the ratio of
average CEO pay to average employee pay was 44:1, but by 2007 it had
16
risen to 344:1. A more recent study of the 300 largest companies in
17
America revealed that this ratio remained steady at 343:1 in 2010.
Accordingly, one of Dodd-Frank’s reforms requires U.S. public
companies to disclose internal pay equity—the ratio between CEO and
18
employee pay. Nonetheless, the ratio of CEO pay to average employee

13. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Federal Attempts to Curb
Perceived Abuses, 10 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 196, 208 (2010).
14. See, e.g., John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is There a Case for Regulating Executive Pay in the
Financial Services Industry?, in After the Crash 115 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2010).
15. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is CEO Pay Too High and Are Incentives Too Low? A
Wealth-Based Contracting Framework, 24 Acad. Mgmt. Persp. 5, 15 (2010) (providing the formula:
“Pay = CEO ability + cost of effort + incentive risk premium + excess pay”).
16. See Lorsch & Khurana, supra note 1, at 30, 31; see also Morrissey, supra note 11, at 13 (“In
1965, the typical American CEO made 24 times the average worker. By 2007, that differential had
increased by more than tenfold to 275, and it has continued to grow.”). Results of various studies differ
somewhat due to the composition of companies that were included in the sample and how
compensation was determined.
17. See Morrissey, supra note 11, at 13 (noting that the ratio of pay for the CEOs of the
300 largest companies in America compared to the average worker was 343:1 in 2010).
18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, § 953 (2010). But see Steven M. Davidoff, A Simple Solution that Made a Hard Problem
More Difficult, N.Y. Times DealBook (Aug. 27, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
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19

pay at large companies grew to 354:1 in 2012. This suggests that further
reform might be needed, though the internal pay equity disclosure
20
requirement has not yet been finalized or implemented by regulators.
Further, data indicates that the compensation level of executives of
U.S. public companies has, indeed, risen dramatically. For example, in
1990 the average total compensation for CEOs was approximately
$2.6 million, but by 2008—when the financial crisis hit—it had risen to
21
approximately $14.1 million. The persistence of large amounts of
executive compensation, particularly in the absence of correspondingly
high levels of corporate financial performance, led to calls for executive
compensation reform. Moreover, a recent study for the period from
1993 to 2012 revealed that “[a]bout 40 percent of the highest-paid CEOs
in the United States over the past 20 years eventually ended up being
fired, paying fraud-related fines or settlements, or accepting government
22
bailout money.”
Interestingly, many members of corporate boards also believe that
executive pay is excessive, even though they determine such pay. For
example, a majority of directors who attended the National Association
of Corporate Directors conference in October 2008 agreed that CEO pay
23
was too high. In addition, a, August 2009 survey of 140 directors of U.S.
public companies found that fifty-nine percent believed that there should
be decreases in executive benefits and perquisites, fifty-two percent felt
that retirement packages should be reduced, and seventy-three percent felt
24
that severance pay should be reduced. Part II of the Article discusses why
some directors approve compensation that they believe is excessive.

08/27/a-simple-solution-that-made-a-hard-problem-more-difficult/?_r=1 (noting that problems in
calculating various types of compensation make it difficult to compare compensation amounts,
especially for multinational conglomerates with employees in different countries).
19. Nadia Damouni, Highest-Paid U.S. CEOs Are Often Fired or Fined: Study, Reuters (Aug. 28,
2013, 2:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/28/us-companies-pay-idUSBRE97R10C20130828
(describing a 2013 report by the Institute for Policy Studies).
20. Id.
21. Forbes, Two Decades of CEO Pay, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2012/12/ceo-compensation-12historical-pay-chart.html.
22. Id.; see Sarah Anderson et al., Inst. Pol’y Stud., Executive Excess 2013: Bailed Out,
Booted, Busted 1 (2013) (examining the 241 CEOs who were the twenty-five highest paid CEOs in
America in one or more of the past twenty years).
23. NACD Directorship, Directors Agree: CEO Pay Too High, Directorship (Oct. 23, 2008),
abstract available at http://governancefocus.blogspot.com/2008/10/directors-agree-ceo-pay-toohigh.html.
24. Jena McGregor, Even Most Directors Think CEO Pay is Too High, Bloomberg
Businessweek (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/careers/managementiq/archives/
2009/09/even_most_directors_think_ceo_pay_is_too_high.html (describing a survey conducted by the
University of Southern California Marshall School of Business). However, forty-nine percent of the
directors surveyed did not support the imposition of say-on-pay and seventy-one percent did not
support the imposition of caps on the amount of pay. Id.
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Of course, many everyday Americans are outraged by the disparity
between the income of the wealthiest one percent and the rest of the
25
population. Politicians were sensitive to that public sentiment, which
was later catalyzed by the related Occupy Wall Street movement. For
example, President Obama called the $18.4 billion in bonuses that Wall
Street financial executives received in the midst of the 2008 financial
26
crisis “shameful.” Moreover, a recent economic study reveals that the
largest group of the highest-income earners are executives and other
27
managers in companies, in finance as well as in other industries. This
supports the notion that high levels of compensation have fueled income
28
disparities.
In contrast, some finance scholars argue that pay levels are efficient.
One scholar suggests that “despite some notable outliers, executive
29
compensation on the whole correlates to results.” Scholars also argue
that although many features of pay packages might appear inconsistent
30
with standard optimal contracting theory, “optimal contracting theories
can explain the recent rapid rise in pay, the low level of incentives and
their negative scaling with firm size, pay-for-luck, the widespread use of
options (as opposed to stock), severance pay and debt compensation, and
31
the insensitivity of incentives to risk.” Other scholars note “that the
sharp growth in executive compensation after the 1970s is accompanied
32
by a similar growth in the stock market value of the firms.” Since
executives have increasingly been compensated in stock rather than cash
during that period, they have benefited from the increase in the value of
33
their companies’ stock.

25. See, e.g., Tami Luhby, Who Are the 1 Percent?, CNNMoney (Oct. 29, 2011, 8:40 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/20/news/economy/occupy_wall_street_income/index.htm (noting that in
2009, the top one percent of American taxpayers made a minimum of $343,927 but an average of
$960,000; they accounted for seventeen percent of the nation’s income).
26. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, Obama Calls Wall Street Bonuses ‘Shameful’, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1.
27. Morrissey, supra note 11, at 6 (citing Peter Whoriskey, With Executive Pay, Rich Pull Away
from Rest of America, Wash. Post (June 18, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-0618/business/35234600_1_income-gap-personal-income-capital-gains (describing a landmark analysis of
tax returns that revealed that forty-one percent of the top 0.1 percent of earners are executives,
managers, and supervisors at non-financial companies, and eighteen percent are in finance).
28. Id. at 5–6.
29. Knowledge @ Wharton, Outrage over Outsized Executive Compensation: Who Should Fix It
and How?, Wharton Sch. Univ. Penn. (Feb. 4, 2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
Article.cfm?Articleid=2151.
30. See discussion infra Subpart II.A.
31. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optional
Contracting Theories, 15 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 486, 486 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265067.
32. Core & Guay, supra note 14, at 118.
33. This is due in part to Congress’ enactment of section 162(m) of the Federal Tax Code in 1993,
which places a $1 million cap on the amount of compensation that public companies can deduct for
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2. Compensation Design
Whereas the above criticisms address the amount of compensation,
other criticisms address the design or structure of compensation. Various
scholars have conducted studies indicating that the incentives created by
the design of executive compensation caused excessive risk taking by
34
banks, which led to the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009. Moreover, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (the “FCIC”), which was appointed
35
by Congress to explore the financial crisis, reached a similar conclusion.
The FCIC found that compensation design played a role in inducing
financial institutions to take reckless risks, which ultimately contributed
36
to the firms’ failure. Compensation at financial institutions such as
Merrill Lynch, AIG, Citigroup, Bear Sterns, and Lehman Brothers
disproportionately rewarded short-term risk taking because it was often
designed to reward short-term gain (e.g., return on equity) without
37
proper consideration of long-term consequences. For example, many
mortgage brokers were paid based on the volume of loans originated
38
rather than the long-term quality or performance of the loans.
Other studies, however, find little relation between the financial
crisis and executive compensation design. For example, one empirical
study revealed that “a greater proportion of incentive pay does not
39
increase the likelihood for a bank to be a problem or failed institution.”
Other scholars note that many boards and executives did not understand
the risk that they were taking, so a different pay structure might have led
40
to the same outcome. Another study found that “[t]here is no evidence
that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the

certain executives but exempts performance-based compensation such as equity compensation. I.R.C.
§ 162(m) (2012).
34. See, e.g., Letter from Sanjai Bhagat et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Apr. 25, 2011), at 5, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-13.pdf; see
also Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Bank Executive Compensation and Capital Requirements Reform 1
(Working Paper, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1781318
(studying the fourteen largest financial institutions from 2000 to 2008).
35. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 61–64 (2011).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 64.
39. Lin Guo et al., Bank Executive Compensation Structure, Risk Taking, and the Financial
Crisis 6–7 (Oct. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664191.
However, this study also noted that “[o]verall, the existing literature indicates that the empirical
findings on the relation among executive compensation, risk taking, valuation and performance in the
banking industry vary with the data and sample selection, regulatory environment, methodologies
used and compensation measurements.” Id. at 10.
40. See, e.g., David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Executive Compensation—Did High Pay Cause the
Financial Crisis?, Stan. U. Corp. Governance & Leadership Wire (Feb. 22, 2010, 6:00 PM),
http://www.stanford.edu/group/gsb_corpgov/cgi-bin/blog/?p=1395.
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interests of their shareholders performed better during the crisis and
41
some evidence that these banks actually performed worse.”
In sum, although there is certainly room for disagreement over
whether executive compensation contributed to the financial crisis, some
evidence (particularly the FCIC study) indicates that it did. With that as
background, this Article now examines the executive compensation and
corporate governance reforms that Dodd-Frank implemented to address
such concerns. Subpart I.B examines the compensation committee
independence requirement, and Subpart I.C briefly summarizes the other
reforms.
B. Compensation Committee Independence Requirement
Dodd-Frank states that the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
“SEC”) will require all U.S. public companies to have a compensation
committee comprised of directors who are independent, as determined
under standards to be promulgated by the national securities exchanges
and associations (such as the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and
42
NASDAQ). Companies that do not comply with the rules will be
43
delisted after being given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect.
However, even before Dodd-Frank, the NYSE already required
compensation committees to be composed entirely of independent
44
directors, and NASDAQ had a similar requirement subject to very
45
limited exceptions. Dodd-Frank essentially codified the preexisting
listing requirements but imposed mandatory consideration of two factors
that impact independence.
The preexisting independence rule had two parts: (1) a general,
catch-all rule that prohibits independent directors from having material
relationships with the company and (2) bright-line tests that prohibit

41. See Mark A. Calabria, Did Bank CEO Compensation Cause the Financial Crisis?, Cato Inst.
(Aug. 18, 2009, 5:34 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/did-bank-ceo-compensation-cause-thefinancial-crisis (quoting Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit
Crisis abstract (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15212, 2009)).
42. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, § 952(a) (2010).
43. Id. § 952(f).
44. N.Y. Stock Exch., Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.02, 303A.05 (2013), available at
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4%5F3&ma
nual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F.
45. Under NASDAQ rules, one director who is not independent may be appointed to the
compensation committee if, under “exceptional and limited circumstances,” such membership is in the
best interests of the company; however, such a member may not serve more than two years.
NASDAQ, Stock Market Rules § 5605(c)(2)(B) (2013), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/
NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_4_3&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2
Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F. Another exception applies to “controlled companies”—companies in which
fifty percent or more of the stock is held by one individual, group, or company. Id. § 5615(c). For
simplicity, this Article will focus on NYSE rather than NASDAQ rules.
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(a) employment of the director or her immediate family members by the
company, its auditor, or certain other related parties and (b) the
director’s receipt of more than $120,000 annually for fees from the
46
company other than director fees or deferred compensation. Boards
were instructed to broadly consider all relevant facts and circumstances
in determining material relationships, which “can include commercial,
industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable, and familial
47
relationships, among others.”
Effective July 1, 2013, the SEC approved new listing standards to
48
implement Dodd-Frank’s requirement, adding to the preexisting rule.
Under the new rule, when assessing whether compensation committee
members have any material relationships that would preclude the
directors’ independence, boards must now consider whether those
directors (1) received any consulting, advisory, or other fees beyond
director fees (the “Fees Factor”), or (2) have any affiliate relationships
49
with the company (the “Affiliate Factor”). These requirements apply to
50
51
companies listed on either the NYSE or NASDAQ. To place this
compensation committee independence requirement in context, this
Article now briefly describes the other executive compensation reforms

46. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.02.
47. Id. § 303A.02(a)(i)(B) cmts.
48. See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-68639; 2013 WL
166322, at 18 (Jan. 11, 2013) (noting that the listing standards commence July 1, 2013, but, due to a
transition rule, “listed companies would have until the earlier of their first annual meeting after
January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, to comply with the new standards for compensation committee
director independence”).
49. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.02.
50. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, §§ 303A.05(a), 303A.02(a)(ii); id. § 303A.02(a)(ii) cmts
(“When considering the sources of a director’s compensation in determining his independence for
purposes of compensation committee service, the board should consider whether the director receives
compensation from any person or entity that would impair his ability to make independent judgments
about the listed company’s executive compensation. Similarly, when considering any affiliate
relationship a director has with the company, a subsidiary of the company, or an affiliate of a
subsidiary of the company, in determining his independence for purposes of compensation committee
service, the board should consider whether the affiliate relationship places the director under the
direct or indirect control of the listed company or its senior management, or creates a direct
relationship between the director and members of senior management, in each case of a nature that
would impair his ability to make independent judgments about the listed company’s executive
compensation.”).
51. NASDAQ Listed Company Manual § 5605. The fees factor was initially stricter for
NASDAQ-listed companies (they had a bright line prohibition on compensation committee members
receiving any compensatory payments other than directors’ fees, whereas such fees were only a factor
that went into the overall independence analysis for NYSE-listed companies) but NASDAQ eventually
amended its rule to conform to the more lenient NYSE rule. David A. Sirignano & Albert Lung,
NASDAQ Amends Compensation Committee Independence Rules, Morgan Lewis (Jan. 16, 2014),
https://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/publicationID/c83e5ed6-d867-4dbc-9d64-13add1a130d6/
fuseaction/publication.detail (citing the amended rule, SR-NASDAQ-2013-147, available at
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/pdf/nasdaq-filings/2013/SR-NASDAQ-2013-147.pdf).
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in Dodd-Frank before exploring the organizational behavior issues that
impact independence.
C. Other Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance
Reforms
In addition to the compensation committee independence
requirement described above, Dodd-Frank imposes several other
executive compensation and corporate governance reforms on U.S. public
52
companies. Because the independence requirement cannot be properly
analyzed without considering these accompanying reforms, this Subpart
briefly describes them. As a whole, the package of reforms is intended to
increase the independence, accountability, and transparency of the paysetting process by creating an environment in which: (1) independent
directors approve executive compensation with the advice of impartial
compensation consultants; (2) directors are held accountable to
shareholders for those decisions due to shareholders’ say-on-pay votes;
(3) executives are held accountable to shareholders by being subject to
clawbacks if the company’s financial reporting is noncompliant; and (4) the
relationships between pay and performance, and between CEO pay and
worker pay become more transparent due to required public disclosure.
Dodd-Frank includes six specific reforms to achieve these goals.
Say-on-Pay. All public companies must provide shareholders with a
so-called “say-on-pay” vote to approve the compensation of its named
53
executive officers at least once every three years. However, this
shareholder vote is only an advisory, nonbinding vote on compensation
that companies have already awarded to executives, and it “may not be
construed—(1) as overruling a decision by such issuer or board of
directors; [or] (2) to create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of
54
such issuer or board of directors.”

52. Exceptions may apply to some U.S. public companies, such as foreign issuers. See DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 952(a)
(2010).
53. Id. § 951(a)(1); see also, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3)(i)–(iv) (2013) (defining “named executive
officers” of a company to include (1) the principal executive officer, (2) the principal financial officer,
(3) “the three most highly compensated executive officers other than [the principal executive officer and
the principal financial officer],” and (4) up to two other executive officers who would have been included
as named executive officers if their employment had not terminated before the end of the year).
54. Dodd-Frank Act § 951(c). In addition, at least once every six years, shareholders will
determine whether the say-on-pay vote will occur every one, two, or three years. Id. § 951(a)(2). Sayon-pay was the key executive compensation reform in Dodd-Frank, and it has been discussed
extensively in the academic literature. See, e.g., Thomas et al., supra note 6. The adoption of say-onpay in the United States followed the adoption of say-on-pay for shareholders of financial institutions
that received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and the earlier adoption of say-on-pay in
other countries (such as the United Kingdom in 2003, the Netherlands in 2004, Australia in 2005,
Sweden in 2006, and Norway and Denmark in 2007). See Jeremy Ryan Delman, Note, Structuring Say-
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Say on Golden Parachutes. Shareholders of public companies can
also vote on “golden parachutes” (such as deal bonuses or accelerated
vesting of stock options) provided to named executive officers in
connection with a change in control of the company, if not already
55
included in the general say-on-pay vote.
Pay Versus Performance Disclosure. Each public company must
disclose in its annual proxy statement the relationship between executive
compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the
company, taking into account any change in the value of the shares of
56
stock and dividends of the company, and any distributions.
Internal Pay Equity Disclosure. Each public company must also
disclose: (1) the median annual total compensation of all its employees
other than the CEO, (2) the annual total compensation of the CEO, and
57
(3) the ratio of the amount in clause (1) to clause (2).
Clawbacks. If a public company is required to prepare an accounting
restatement due to material noncompliance with any financial reporting
requirement, then the company will recover any excess amounts of
incentive-based compensation received by any current or former
58
executive officer during the three years before the restatement.
Compensation Consultants. Compensation committees may only
select a compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other advisor after
taking into account factors identified by the SEC that affect the
59
independence of such advisors. Interestingly, personal relationships
must be explicitly included in the independence determination for
consultants, but need not be included in the independence determination
60
for compensation committee members.
Before analyzing the adequacy of these reforms, this Article
explores insights that organizational behavior theory provides about the
pay-setting process.

on-Pay: A Comparative Look at Global Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation,
2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 583, 591–97.
55. Dodd-Frank Act § 951(b). See generally Kyoko Takahashi Lin, Bernice Grant, Ron Aizen &
Jamila Diggs, Will Mandatory Shareholder Approval of Golden Parachutes Dull Their Luster?, 4 Deal
Law., no. 4, July-Aug. 2010.
56. Dodd-Frank Act § 953.
57. Id. § 953(b)(1)(A)–(C).
58. Id. § 954.
59. Id. § 952(b)(1). However, compensation committees are not actually required to hire an
independent consultant; they only need to do the independence analysis, but are then free to select a
consultant of their choice. See id. The factors affecting advisors’ independence include the provision of
other services to the company by the advisor, the amount of fees received from the company by the
advisor as a percentage of total revenue of the advisor, the policies and procedures of the advisor that
are designed to prevent conflicts of interest, any business or personal relationship of the consultant
with a compensation committee member or an executive offer, and any company stock owned by the
advisor. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.05(c).
60. Dodd-Frank Act § 952(b)(2)(D).
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II. Organizational Behavior Literature
As discussed in Subpart I.A, financial economists have conducted
studies that produced inconsistent results regarding executive
compensation. This Part explores the traditional model for directors’
determination of management compensation—the optimal contracting
theory—and discusses the psychological aspects of boardroom dynamics
that reveal shortcomings of that model and lead directors to favor
executive interests over shareholder interests. These boardroom
dynamics form the basis of this Article’s recommendations in Part III.
A. Optimal Contracting Theory
It is well-known in corporate law that the separation between
management and ownership of corporations creates an agency problem
that, theoretically, is addressed by having the shareholders appoint a board
of directors that has the power to direct the affairs of the corporation and
61
supervise management. Under the optimal contracting theory, directors
are expected to bargain with management at arm’s length in order to set
management’s compensation, with the exclusive goal of serving
62
shareholders’ interests. This theory assumes that the board is not
“captured” or controlled by the interests of management; it is instead
sufficiently independent from management to bargain with management
63
at arms’ length. Due to the separation of ownership and control of
public companies, the board of directors, which is appointed by the
shareholders to run the company, should design an optimal and efficient
64
pay structure that aligns the interests of the CEO and the shareholders.
65
However, the empirical evidence in support of this result is mixed.
Financial economists have performed studies that test the arm’s length
66
bargaining model, and their tests have yielded conflicting results. As
explored further below, some empirical studies show that psychological
factors, unaccounted for under optimal contracting theory, affect the
relationship between the board and the CEO, playing a critical role in
67
determining executive compensation. Indeed, the managerial power
theory appears to be more realistic than the optimal contracting theory.

61. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (1932).
62. See Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance 15–18 (2004); see also Omari
Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation Reform,
62 SMU L. Rev. 299, 315–17 (2009).
63. See Simmons, supra note 62, at 315.
64. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 17–18.
65. Charles A. O’Reilly III & Brian G. M. Main, Economic and Psychological Perspectives on
CEO Compensation: A Review and Synthesis, 19 Indus. & Corp. Change 675, 679 (2010).
66. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 18.
67. E.g., O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 675.
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B. Managerial Power Theory
In contrast to the optimal contracting model, some scholars have
68
conducted empirical studies that support the managerial power theory.
These empirical studies suggest that managerial power and influence
might be a better lens through which to view the process of setting
executive compensation than the principal-agent/arm’s length bargaining
69
model due to the captured nature of the board. As explained above, a
board that has been “captured” by management serves the interests of
management rather than shareholders.
Many scholars, most prominently Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried,
have explored the effect of managerial power on the effectiveness of the
compensation committee of the board of directors. In their well-known
2006 book Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Executive Compensation, Bebchuk and Fried argue that the pay-setting
process in public companies does not reflect arm’s length bargaining
between executives and the boards who represent shareholders; boards
70
have failed in their role as guardians of shareholder interests. The
managerial power theory posits that directors are subject to influence
from management that enables management to extract “rents”—extra
value beyond what management would obtain under arm’s length
71
bargaining—during the pay-setting process.
On the other hand, some scholars disagree with the managerial power
theory. For example, Stephen Bainbridge argues that empirical evidence
72
does not support the managerial power model. He notes “that there are
relatively modest differences in pay practices between firms that have a
73
controlling shareholder and those with dispersed share ownership,” even
though one would not expect a controlling shareholder to permit
management to extract rents at its expense. “As such, the observation that
the allegedly questionable compensation practices occur both in
companies with dispersed ownership and those with concentrated

68. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 63 (citing Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan,
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. Econ. 901 (2001); Olivier
Jean Blanchard et al., What Do Firms Do with Cash Windfalls?, 36 J. Fin. Econ. 337 (1994); David
Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. Fin.
449 (1997)). See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751 (2002).
69. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 675; see Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the
Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation,
30 J. Corp. L. 255, 255 (2005) (describing the results of an experimental model of the executive
compensation process that indicate that the managerial power theory is correct that CEOs’ power over
directors results in excessive compensation).
70. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at x, 61.
71. Id. at 61.
72. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, Regulation, Spring 2009, at 42, 44.
73. Id.
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ownership may suggest that those practices are attributable to
74
phenomena other than managerial control.”
Other scholars have noted that “the six-fold increase of CEO pay
between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the six-fold increase in
75
market capitalization of large U.S. companies.” That is to say, the
increase in CEO pay during that period was aligned with the increase in
value of shareholders’ stock, which suggests that executive compensation
was appropriately designed to serve shareholder interests.
Although Bebchuk and Fried have written extensively in this area,
other scholars have contributed to the literature as well, particularly
76
regarding the director independence issue. “[T]he results of empirical
studies examining the influence of independent directors on [a] board’s
77
decision-making process are inconclusive.” For example, one scholar
notes that “there is no evidence to suggest that appointing a wholly
independent compensation committee will ensure better risk
management” perhaps partially because “the definition of ‘independence’
is elusive; cognitive biases limit directors’ ability to act or make decisions
78
in a manner consistent with a theoretical perception of independence.”
Other scholars recommend that boards “change the structural, social and
psychological environment of the board so that directors (even those
who fulfill the requirements of independence) no longer see themselves
79
as effectively employees of the CEO.”
C. Psychological Theories
The managerial influence discussed above is arguably caused by
various psychological and sociological factors that incentivize directors to
approve generous compensation packages for the management team of

74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?,
123 Q.J. Econ. 49, 49 (2008)).
76. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board
Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 846, 848 (2011)
(“Board Capture provides an underlying justification for overhauling the entire system and its
supporters have pressed for sweeping changes to the current system.”).
77. Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management
Oversight Obligations, 45 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 55, 99 (2011) (citing Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black,
The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921,
924–26 (1999); Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The Effects
of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 935, 936 (2003); Idalene F. Kesner et al.,
Board Composition and the Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies,
29 Acad. Mgmt. J. 789, 794–96 (1986)).
78. Id. (citing Bhagat & Black, supra note 77, at 923; Lisa Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside
Director, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 127 (2010)).
79. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 675 (citing Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What the Problems Are, and How to Fix
Them 9 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004)).
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the company on whose board the directors serve. As explained by
Bebchuk and Fried:
Directors have had various economic incentives to support, or at least
go along with, arrangements favorable to the company’s top
executives. Various social and psychological factors—collegiality, team
spirit, a natural desire to avoid conflict within the board team, and
sometimes friendship and loyalty—have also pulled board members in
that direction. . . . A substantial body of evidence does indeed indicate
that pay has been higher, and less sensitive to performance, when
80
executives have more power.

Of particular interest, Bebchuk and Fried believed that the rule
implemented by the NYSE in 2003, that required compensation
committee members to be independent, would weaken, but not
eliminate, the factors that lead directors to favor executives at the
81
expense of shareholders.
Norms of reciprocity, groupthink, polarization, social cascades, and
herding are some of the psychological factors that can lead boards to
approve excessive levels of executive compensation. These factors are
described further below.
1.

Norms of Reciprocity

Scholars have found that the following factors play a key role in the
establishment of high levels of CEO pay: indebtedness, deference to
82
authority, social forces, social status, and peer group comparison. In
particular, studies have found that a compensation committee chair is
more likely to approve a large compensation package for the CEO if the
chair (1) was appointed to the board during the tenure of the current
CEO rather than her predecessor; (2) makes more money than the CEO;
83
and/or (3) is of a lower socioeconomic status than the CEO.
These studies reveal that norms of reciprocity that affect all social
interactions are present in boards as well. For example, compensation
committee chairs presumably approve higher CEO pay if they were
appointed during the CEO’s tenure because they feel indebted to the CEO
for being appointed to her board. Although directors are technically
appointed by the nominating committee, which must be composed entirely
of independent directors under NYSE listing requirements, CEOs still
84
have significant influence on the nomination process. Indeed, “[f]ar from

80. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 4–5.
81. Id. at 43. However, the new independence requirement imposed by Dodd-Frank is
supplemental to this preexisting independence requirement. See supra Subpart I.B.
82. Bebchuk et al., supra note 68, at 783–95.
83. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 687–703.
84. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 26 (citing Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of
Directors and Executive Compensation: Economics & Psychological Perspectives, 4 Indus. & Corp.
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being selected by shareholders, directors frequently are selected for
consideration by the CEO. Although the slate of directors is put forward
by the nominating committee, the names on the slate are generally
85
suggested by the CEO.”
Directors are also likely to identify with the CEO because many
directors are CEOs of other public companies; as such, they are less likely
86
to view high levels of CEO compensation as exorbitant. CEOs who serve
as directors of other companies have self-interested incentives to approve
high compensation for the CEOs of the companies on whose board they
87
serve because CEO pay is set using peer group comparisons. In addition,
directors have incentives to approve high levels of pay in order to remain
in the good graces of the CEO and retain their board seat. Directors
enjoy significant fees for serving on the board and board committees.
The median values of such fees were approximately $200,000 for board
88
service and $7500 for committee service as of 2009. As of 2012, the
median fee for outside directors of the biggest companies was
89
$244,637 according to the National Association of Corporate Directors.
Although these figures might not be large enough to motivate some
wealthy directors, directorships often generate additional directorships,
such that many directors serve on multiple boards and generate board
90
fees from multiple companies simultaneously. Moreover, directors
receive significant prestige—and sometimes perquisites—for serving on
91
boards, and membership can generate business and social connections.
As explained above, norms of reciprocity may motivate corporate
directors to approve high amounts of executive compensation. Moreover,
studies show that reciprocity is more likely to occur when groups are

Change 293 (1995); Cynthia A. Montgomery & Rhonda Kaufman, The Board’s Missing Link,
81 Harv. Bus. Rev. 86, 89 (2003)).
85. Erica Beecher-Monas, The Risks of Reward: The Role of Executive Compensation in Financial
Crisis, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 101, 119 (2011).
86. Id. at 120 (citing Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory
and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 811, 845 n.145
(2003) (“CEOs of other companies constitute some 63% of outside directors”); Korn/Ferry Int’l,
30th Annual Board of Directors Study 10 (2003) (finding that eighty-three percent of boards
included a CEO or chief operating officer of another firm in 2002)).
87. Id. at 121.
88. Theresa Tovar & Robert Newbury, Has Director Pay Found Its Floor?, Executive
Compensation Bull. (Towers Watson), Aug. 2010, at 3, 6.
89. Joann S. Lublin, The 40-Year Club: America’s Longest Serving Directors, Wall St. J. (July 16,
2013, 7:45 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323664204578607924055967366.html.
90. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Corporate Boards Should Add Diversity to the Mix, N.Y. Times
DealBook (Mar. 8, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/corporate-boards-shouldadd-diversity-to-the-mix (noting one executive that held over thirty board positions).
91. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 25. But see Davidoff, supra note 90 (noting that director
positions have “become less of a perquisite or a way to build client relationships and more of a job”
due to increased time obligations of approximately 225 hours per year).
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small and homogeneous and continue to interact over time. Corporate
boards tend to be small and homogenous, as is discussed further below.
Additionally, directors often interact indefinitely over time (provided
they are reelected to the board) because most directors are not subject to
93
term limits. In fact, over one-third of independent directors of Russell
3000 companies have served a decade or longer, and twenty-eight of
94
them (albeit less than one percent) have served for at least forty years.
It is difficult for independent directors to remain truly independent in
95
thought when they serve on the same board for decades. Accordingly,
the Council of Institutional Investors—a governance advocate—plans to
encourage shareholders and boards to question the independence of
directors with very long tenures, and proxy advisors are beginning to
consider new policies that would deem outside directors non-independent
96
if they have served on the board for long terms.
2. Groupthink, Polarization, Social Cascades, and Herding
a. Groupthink
Groupthink is another psychological factor that can impact
corporate boards. Indeed, one scholar articulated a Group Dynamics
Theory to encapsulate his argument that “the problems with CEO
compensation in public corporations may be caused at least in part by the
97
decision-making flaws rooted in group dynamics,” such as groupthink.
Groupthink is the tendency of cohesive and homogenous groups to
adopt homogenous views and faulty decisionmaking due to failure to
98
consider alternatives. Groupthink is more likely to occur when a
cohesive group has structural organizational faults and/or a provocative
situational context such as high stress, difficult decisions to be made, recent
99
group failures, or difficult moral dilemmas —these are arguably common
factors in the pay-setting process. Irving Janis identified eight symptoms of
groupthink: (1) illusions of invulnerability; (2) unquestioned belief in the
morality of the group; (3) rationalization for dismissing warnings;

92. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 685.
93. See, e.g., Lublin, supra note 89 (discussing directors that have served over forty years).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.; Bob Romanchek & Jeff Keckley, Director Independence: A Focus on Board Tenure,
Directorship (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.directorship.com/director-independence-a-focus-on-boardtenure.
97. Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 Cardozo L.
Rev. 2025, 2029 (2007).
98. See id. at 2035–42 (discussing groupthink extensively).
99. Andrew Howard, Groupthink and Corporate Governance Reform: Changing the Formal and
Informal Decisionmaking Processes of Corporate Boards, 20 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 425, 427 (2011)
(citing Irving L. Janis, Groupthink 176–77 (2d ed. 1982)).
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(4) stereotypes of group opponents as weak, evil, biased, spiteful,
impotent, or stupid; (5) self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the
consensus; (6) illusions of unanimity among group members; (7) direct
pressure to conform applied to members who question the group; and
100
(8) mind guards who shield the group from dissenting information.
Corporate boards tend to be homogenous, which predisposes them
to groupthink. Because board members are often selected from a small
pool, they often have similar educational, professional, and other
101
affiliations and relationships before they join the board. Moreover,
normally independent directors might share strong social ties with the
CEO, such as belonging to the same social clubs, civic organizations, or
102
simply being friends. This can have troubling results for independent
directors charged with monitoring executives because having a social
relationship “disposes one to interpret favorably another’s intentions and
103
actions.”
Moreover, independence can even be strained by shared connections
that do not rise to the level of strong social ties. Affinity caused by shared
backgrounds, for example, has been shown to affect director
104
decisionmaking. Byoung-Hyoun Hwang and Seoyoung Kim conducted
an interesting empirical study of Fortune 100 companies from 1996 to
2005 and found that common backgrounds between CEOs and their
105
nominally independent directors resulted in higher CEO pay.
Specifically, they found that having a “socially independent board,” in
which a majority of directors are both conventionally and socially
independent, has a statistically significant effect in reducing CEO
compensation: “the average drop in total compensation [was]
$3.3 million, while average total compensation for the sample [was]
106
A nominally independent director was considered
$12.8 million.”
“socially dependent” if she had two or more social ties with the

100. Id. at 431–34.
101. Johnson, supra note 77, at 104 (citing Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate
Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo.
L.J. 797, 810 n.60 (2001)); see Dorff, supra note 97, at 2045 (“Public company directors are generally
either CEOs of other public companies or firm lawyers, investment bankers, former politicians, or
prominent academics.”).
102. Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1175,
1179 (2011).
103. Id. (quoting Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 Am. Soc. Rev. 674, 678 (1996)).
104. Id. at 1180 (citing Byoung-Hyoun Hwang & Seoyoung Kim, It Pays to Have Friends, 93 J. Fin.
Econ. 138, 139 (2009)).
105. Id. at 1180–82.
106. Id. at 1182 (citing Hwang & Kim, supra note 104, at 146). However, Hwang and Kim’s study
has some limitations—for example, they did not control for the more commonly identified social
influences that have been shown to affect CEO pay. Id. at 1184. The study also seems to focus on the
social ties of the overall board rather than just the compensation committee. See id.
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company’s CEO, such as “mutual alma mater, military service, regional
107
origin, academic discipline, [or] industry.” Thus, “Hwang and Kim’s
study offers important empirical evidence confirming our suspicions that
existing definitions of independence may not capture all the potential
108
influences that may affect directors’ impartiality.”
The homogeneity of corporate boards is also attributable to a lack
109
of gender and racial diversity. Many scholars have argued that
increasing diversity might strengthen corporate boards. For example,
Lisa Fairfax indicates that “[m]ost social and psychological data on group
dynamics suggest that having a diverse group of directors will facilitate a
board’s decision-making function because that data reveals that
110
heterogeneous groups tend to make higher quality decisions.”
Furthermore, age similarity has been shown to enhance social
influence. For example, one study found that CEO compensation is
higher if the CEO and compensation committee members are closer in
111
age. As such, a board with greater age diversity might be less subject to
social influence by the CEO.
Groupthink occurs because people make decisions based on their
112
perspective, which is shaped and limited by their personal backgrounds.
Adding directors with diverse backgrounds can facilitate the consideration
113
of other viewpoints. However, while diversity can reduce groupthink,
and most directors support board diversity, corporate board diversity has
not increased much over the years, and some directors question its
114
value.

107. Id. at 1181–82 (citing Hwang & Kim, supra note 104, at 140–42 (explaining how these social
ties produce enhanced interaction, shared experiences, and common interests)).
108. Id. at 1185.
109. For example, a recent study found that white men hold nearly seventy percent of Fortune 100
board seats, women (of all races) hold twenty percent, and minorities (of both genders) hold sixteen
percent (though they comprise thirty-seven percent of the population). Martha C. White, Top
Boardrooms: No-Go Areas for Women, Minorities, NBCNews.com (Aug. 16, 2013 4:51 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/top-boardrooms-no-go-areas-women-minorities-6C10936005
(referencing Alliance for Bd. Diversity, Missing Pieces: Women and Minorities on Fortune 500
Boards (2010)).
110. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business
Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 795, 831.
111. Tung, supra note 102, at 1179 (citing Main et al., supra note 84, at 319–20).
112. Id.
113. Davidoff, supra note 90 (arguing that greater diversity on corporate boards is needed, and
noting that “[a]dding two or three board members with more diverse backgrounds could spur more
critical thinking — a type of introspection that was absent before the crisis”).
114. Kimberly D. Krawiec et al., The Danger of Difference: Tension in Directors’ Views of
Corporate Board Diversity, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 919, 920–22; see David A. Carter et al., The Gender
and Ethnic Diversity of U.S. Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 Corp.
Governance 396, 396 (2010) (finding that “[w]e do not find a significant relationship between the
gender or ethnic diversity of the board, or important board committees, and financial performance for
a sample of major US corporations”).
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b. Polarization
Homogenous groups are also prone to polarization—taking extreme
115
This, of course, presents particular concerns in the
positions.
compensation-setting process because:
even if the individual members of a compensation committee would
prefer a more modest pay package, if the group has a predilection
toward higher pay levels, that will be the decision. This phenomenon is
more acute when the group is homogeneous, as it tends to be at the
upper echelon of corporate management, because if group members
116
share a particular bias, polarization may magnify its impact.

c.

Social Cascades

Corporate boards can also be affected by social cascades. Social
cascades are dynamics in which people follow a leader’s actions because
they lack sufficient information to form their own opinions about a
117
decision. In the compensation-setting context, social cascades can occur
when the compensation committee is unduly swayed by the opinion of
the CEO or the compensation consultants who are retained to prepare
and present compensation packages.
Indeed, compensation committees in the post-Dodd-Frank
environment are particularly susceptible to social cascades. As explained
by Fairfax:
[The recent reforms] increase the possibility that boards will unduly
rely on management, advisors, and outside consultants in a manner
that could have significant negative repercussions. . . . [A]necdotal and
other evidence suggest that when directors believe that they lack the
necessary expertise to grapple with particular issues, they tend to rely
more heavily on managers and other advisors perceived to have such
expertise. From this perspective, it is no surprise that the growing
influence of compensation consultants coincides with the increased
emphasis on independent directors who often may feel ill equipped to
tackle the complexities of compensation matters. Finally, increasing
shareholders’ power [through say-on-pay votes, proxy access, etc.] also
may increase the potential for enhanced reliance on outside
118
consultants such as proxy and advisory firms.

Subpart III.A proposes continuing professional education to remedy
this social cascades factor.

115. Beecher-Monas, supra note 85, at 124.
116. Id. (citing Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1141, 1141 (1986)).
117. Dorff, supra note 97, at 2042–52 (discussing social cascades extensively).
118. Lisa M. Fairfax, Government Governance and the Need to Reconcile Government Regulation
with Board Fiduciary Duties, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1692, 1719–20 (2011).
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d. Herding
Social cascades and groupthink are closely related to another
phenomenon: herding. As discussed above, directors often have personal
ties to each other and the CEO. These personal ties can lead to herding,
which is the tendency of group members to follow the crowd when
119
making decisions, despite having other information. Furthermore,
compensation consultants might propose similar pay packages to
120
multiple companies due to the herding phenomenon.
Part III of this Article now explores ways in which the organizational
behavior findings described above can be applied to improve the process
of setting executive compensation.

III. Critique of Dodd-Frank and Proposal for Additional
Reforms
Parts I and II of this Article show that Dodd-Frank’s compensation
committee independence requirement does not address certain
organizational behavior factors that can impair directors’ objectivity. This
Part tackles the question of how we can use the organizational behavior
findings described above to improve the independent judgment of
compensation committees. Ultimately, this analysis shows that (1) the SEC
appropriately determined that it was impractical to require consideration
of personal relationships in the independence assessment, but
(2) additional reforms are needed to counteract the organizational
behavior issues that might impair independent action. To that end, this
Article recommends two additional reforms, and to provide an
international perspective, positions those reforms within the global
corporate governance landscape.
As described in Subpart I.C, Dodd-Frank’s executive compensation
reforms were intended to increase the independence, accountability, and
transparency of the pay-setting process. The compensation committee
independence requirement, especially when combined with the
compensation advisor independence analysis, is intended to diminish
conflicts of interest that can occur when the members of the compensation
committee and/or their advisors lack independence and objectivity to
determine executive compensation in an arm’s length fashion.
While the goal of greater independence is sensible, independent
judgment and action will not be achieved unless the social dynamics that
impact boardrooms and discourage board members from thinking and
acting independently are addressed. The problem is that the independence
rules ignore social influence and assume “away social norms and social

119. Beecher-Monas, supra note 85, at 129.
120. Id.
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pressures that we know affect behavior.”
Indeed, “[f]ormal
independence without social independence may be insufficient to assure
122
The compensation
the effectiveness of independent directors.”
committee independence reform does not directly address this issue;
rather, it focuses only on whether a director has received compensation
other than director fees or has affiliations with the company. Moreover,
similar factors were already in the preexisting rule as suggested (albeit
not mandatory) considerations, so the new rule does not substantially
change the independence analysis.
A. Consideration of Personal Relationships
One solution to the organizational behavior issues would be to
mandate the consideration of personal relationships in the determination
of director independence. As described in Subpart I.B, to qualify as
independent, a director may not have any “material relationship” with
123
the listed company. “Material relationships can include commercial,
industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable and familial
124
relationships, among others.” However, there is no explicit requirement
to consider personal or social relationships—although boards are
instructed to “broadly consider all relevant facts and circumstances” that
125
might signal potential conflicts of interest. This presents the question of
whether the language in the independence definition is already broad
enough to encourage boards to consider personal relationships, or
whether something more explicit is needed. Although “familial”
relationships are included in the list above, personal relationships are
not. Further, the list does not mandate that boards consider any of the
listed relationships; it only suggests them for possible consideration.
Before adopting the new independence rule in 2013, the SEC issued
126
a proposed rule in 2011 and sought comments on it. Specifically, the
SEC asked for comments as to whether the exchanges should be
required to include personal or business relationships between a
compensation committee member and an executive officer of the
company, as mandatory factors for consideration, in addition to the Fees
127
Factor and the Affiliate Factor. Several commentators responded
121. Tung, supra note 102, at 1178.
122. Id. at 1177 (noting that “socially dependent directors” are nominally independent directors
who share a common background with the CEO).
123. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.02.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, Release Nos. 33-9199, 34-64149, 46 Fed.
Reg. 18,966 (Apr. 6, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240).
127. Id. at 18,971 (The SEC asked: “Should there be additional factors apart from the two
proposed factors required to be considered? For example, should the exchanges be required to include
business or personal relationships between a compensation committee member and an executive officer
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affirmatively, and although these comments were not ultimately adopted,
they provide helpful insight regarding independence issues.
For example, the National Association of Corporate Directors
recommended that in nominating compensation committee members, the
“governance/nominating committee and the board should take account
of personal friendships, prior business relationships, and even ties
created by philanthropic activities between the CEO and the prospective
committee member” because these “types of relationships may interfere
with the committee member’s objectivity in evaluating CEO performance
128
and setting executive pay.” Also, the Council of Institutional Investors
urged the SEC to consider family linkages, ties to executive officers and
relationships with other directors, in addition to the existing standards
when defining the independence standards for compensation committee
129
members.
Several commentators also noted that board interlocks, which occur
130
when executives serve on each other’s boards, can impair independence.
Indeed, as a former CEO commented, “[t]he most effective way to
encourage independence of compensation committee members is to
prohibit interlocking corporate directorships. ‘You scratch my back, I’ll
scratch yours’ is all too common, especially when officers are on one
131
another’s boards.” Conflicts of interests can also arise if a director is an
executive officer of another company whose peer group includes the
company on whose board she serves, because her decisions about the
compensation of executives at that company might affect her own
employee compensation due to the use of peer group comparisons in
132
setting executive pay.

of the issuer as mandatory factors for consideration? Should the exchanges be required to include
board interlocks or employment of a director at a company included in the listed issuer’s
compensation peer group as mandatory factors for consideration? Would any such requirements
unduly restrain a company in setting the composition of its board of directors?” (emphasis added)).
128. Letter from Barbara H. Franklin & Kenneth Daly, Nat’l Ass’n of Corporate Dirs., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-29.pdf (concerning the proposed rules for listing
standards for compensation committees and referencing a report from 2003).
129. Letter from Justin Levis, Senior Research Assoc., Council of Institutional Investors, to
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 20, 2011), at 2–3, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-12.pdf.
130. See, e.g., Letter from Georg Merkl to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
(Apr. 1, 2011), at 4–5, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-2.pdf; see also Levis,
supra note 129, at 3.
131. Letter from John K. Lundberg, former CEO Crum Forster, to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-1.htm.
132. Merkl, supra note 130, at 5. See Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. &
Mun. Emps., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 29, 2011), at 2–3, available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-31.pdf; see Meredith Miller, Chief Corp. Governance
Officer, UAW Retiree Med. Benefits Trust, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n

Grant_21 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete)

786

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

4/9/2014 4:37 PM

[Vol. 65:761

In the litigation context, courts have also voiced similar concern that
directors who meet the independence requirements are still subject to
managerial influence. For example, the Delaware Chancery Court has
suggested in some litigation matters that social, civic, and personal
connections (such as shared university attendance or golf club
membership) should be considered in assessing the independence of
133
directors. In In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware
Chancery Court refused to abide by a decision of the special litigation
committee of independent directors because their ties to Stanford
University due to shared university attendance, donation, or employment,
134
created reasonable doubt as to the directors’ impartiality.
In a more recent case involving Barnes & Noble, the Delaware
Chancery Court suggested that friendship, frequent socialization, and
golf playing could impair the independence of putatively independent
135
directors. These Delaware decisions reflect a judicial acknowledgment
that the determination of true independence might require consideration
136
of personal ties in addition to the existing independence standards. On
the other hand, some commentators believe that the listing standards
should not adopt per se prohibitions on specific relationships because the
listing standards are sufficiently broad to permit appropriate consideration
137
of all factors that affect independence.
Moreover, it does not seem feasible to prohibit independent
directors from having personal ties to executives, given the pervasiveness
of personal relationships between board members and executives and
(Apr. 27, 2011), at 1–3, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-15.pdf (providing
comments similar to those of McEntee); supra text accompanying note 84.
133. Richard E. Wood, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP, Compensation
Committee Structure, Function and Best Practices 7–10, 13 (2004) (citing Biondi v. Scrushy,
820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003)). But
see Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
134. In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 920.
135. Steven M. Davidoff, How Independent Are Barnes & Noble Directors?, N.Y. Times
DealBook (Oct. 25, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/how-independent-arebarnes-noble-directors. However, Judge Strine eventually dismissed the case against the directors who
allegedly unfairly sided with the chairman. Phil Milford & Jef Feeley, Barnes & Noble Wins Dismissal
of 4 Directors from Lawsuit, Bloomberg (Mar. 27, 2012, 1:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201203-27/barnes-noble-wins-dismissal-of-4-directors-from-lawsuit.html. The chairman of Barnes & Noble
settled the remaining claim. See Phil Milford & Jef Feeley, Barnes & Noble Chief Said to Settle Suit for
$29 Million, Businessweek (June 14, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-13/barnesand-noble-chief-said-to-settle-suit-for-29-million.
136. Davidoff, supra note 135.
137. See, e.g., Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 28, 2011), at 2–3, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s7131118.pdf (noting “we do not believe that there should be any inference that the existing listing standards
do not already adequately address the considerations of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding
a director’s relationship with the issuer, or the issuer’s management, that may affect compensation
committee member independence and are consistent with the objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act and
the proposed rulemaking”).
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obvious difficulties in measuring, monitoring, and evaluating such ties.
For example, how would one evaluate the many social ties that directors
and executives have from attending the same Masters of Business
Administration programs, places of worship, and/or country clubs?
Clearly, it would be impractical to disallow all such ties. Further,
personal relationships can take on many forms, and it would be difficult
to define and determine which relationships are more problematic than
others from an independence standpoint. Indeed, as explained by Tung:
Rather than driving us to rethink independence requirements, Hwang
and Kim’s findings may instead cast doubt that a workable definition of
independence exists that could possibly capture the variety of shared
experiences that might dampen conventionally independent directors’
monitoring incentives. Any such attempt at rulemaking would be
138
unavoidably over-and underinclusive.

In short, “social incentives are messy; they are difficult to measure
or analyze rigorously. Perhaps that explains why social influences on
nominally independent directors have only recently begun to draw
139
scholarly attention.” In addition, although diversity caused by hiring
directors with fewer social ties could be helpful in stimulating alternative
viewpoints, it could also undermine trust on boards and lessen directors’
140
effectiveness.
Tung argues that although the appropriate policy response to
Hwang and Kim’s study is unclear, “we may need to rely on the finegrained ex post analysis of judges, as exemplified by Vice Chancellor
Strine in Oracle” because “shared experiences and other social
influences may be too numerous and subtle for comprehensive ex ante
141
enumeration.” However, this Article suggests an ex ante approach that
would reduce the need for judges to detect and undo, on an ex post basis,
the effect of the proverbial “golden handcuffs” that bind nominally
independent directors to CEOs. Also, the recommendations proposed
herein will mitigate the impact of personal relationships on board
dynamics in a manner that is more practical than injecting personal
relationships into the independence assessment.

138. Tung, supra note 102, at 1185. Tung further notes that although then-current definitions of
director independence could perhaps be improved, “Hwang and Kim’s interesting findings may not
translate easily to crafting stricter definitions of independence.” Id. For more information on Hwang
and Kim’s findings, see supra Subpart II.C.2.
139. Tung, supra note 102, at 1178.
140. Fairfax, supra note 110, at 833 (citing Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trust
Worthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1796–99
(2001) (discussing the importance of trust in corporate decisionmaking)).
141. Tung, supra note 102, at 1185.
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B. Comparative Law Considerations
From a comparative law standpoint, the United States is the
originator of the concept of independent directors, and is still its most
142
enthusiastic supporter. Director independence in the European Union
143
typically follows the U.S. model of not considering social ties. Director
independence typically encompasses only financial and familial
144
independence from controlling shareholders and top corporate officers.
Even if the director has “social ties to the controller,” she will be
considered independent as long as she has “no close family or financial
145
ties, such as an employment position or a consulting relationship.”
However, such independence is often token, especially in countries such as
Germany and France, which have supervisory boards that are comprised
of shareholder representatives and employee representatives, as each of
146
such groups represents the interests of the group that appointed it.
C. Recommendations
In light of all the above considerations, this Article advocates a
creative approach to augmenting the independence of compensation
committee members, while avoiding the concerns noted above. The
Article proposes two reforms: (1) a requirement for compensation
committee members to have continuing professional education regarding
compensation issues and (2) a rotation system that encourages the
compensation committee (or at least the chair thereof) to rotate off the
committee after a certain number of years. The remainder of this Article
addresses these two recommendations in turn.
These reforms are similar to the requirements under SarbanesOxley that require (1) financial literacy of all members—and financial
expertise of at least one member—of the audit committee and (2) the
lead and concurring partners of the accounting firm that conducts a
147
company’s audit to rotate off the client engagement every five years.
1. Continuing Professional Education
The first recommendation is that compensation committee members
should be required to have continuing professional education to ensure
that they are knowledgeable and up to date regarding best practices in
executive compensation, as well as the complex business, legal, tax, and

142. Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law 65 (2d ed. 2009).
143. Id. at 95.
144. Id. at 182 (noting that unlike the United States, corporations in several E.U. countries such as
Italy and France typically have large blockholders, such as the state or families).
145. Id. at 95.
146. Id. at 64–65.
147. Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2013).
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accounting considerations that affect executive compensation decisions.
These rules are complex and evolving. Knowledge of fundamental
principles and best practices can help improve decisionmaking.
Requiring professional education will help to ensure that compensation
committees are fully equipped to make appropriate decisions regarding
executive compensation packages, and are not overly influenced by
possible pressure from compensation consultants or the CEO. This is
especially important for the director who has the difficult role of
compensation committee chair.
This recommendation is timely: a recent in-depth examination of
compensation committee processes of twenty large U.S. public companies
revealed that this consideration of expertise and independence is one of
148
the five main considerations for compensation committees. The study
revealed that “[w]hile many boards consider director expertise and
independence in determining who will serve on the compensation
committee, many of the interviewees had previous professional or
personal ties to management before joining the board. Thus, in reality,
149
actual independence was sometimes not emphasized.” One of the
implications of this finding was that “compensation committee members
need the right background and mind-set to understand executive
compensation issues at a deep level, including the fairness of committee
150
decisions in the eyes of shareholders and managers.” Directors of
public companies “tend to be highly intelligent, educated, sophisticated,
and busy” but might lack knowledge about specific compensation
151
practices. Moreover, the study “revealed that compensation committee
members felt a profound tension between the demands of management
and those of shareholders. One interviewee noted that the compensation
committee ‘is the only board committee where you sit on the opposite
152
side of the table from management.’”
a. Support for Continuing Education and Relationship to
Organizational Behavior Theory
Several practitioners have discussed in practitioner journals the
general need for compensation committee members to be knowledgeable.
This Article takes the next step of proposing mandatory education,
148. Dana R. Hermanson et al., What Are Compensation Committee Members Thinking About?,
Directorship (Jan. 24, 2013, 8:48 PM), http://www.directorship.com/what-are-compensationcommittee-members-thinking-about.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Dorff, supra note 97, at 2045 (emphasis omitted) (“[Directors] have little incentive to spend
time working through the details of a complex compensation package, much less to dream up alternatives
to the traditional forms of compensation. They are far more likely to defer to the status quo, assuming
that the sophisticated boards that have made this decision before them have acted correctly.”).
152. Hermanson et al., supra note 148.
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coupled with a rotation program, and it grounds such recommendations
within a scholarly and theoretical framework. As explained by two
executive compensation practitioners:
Unlike audit committee members, there is no requirement for
compensation committee members to have any particular expertise.
However, it is beneficial for compensation committee members and
top executives to be educated about compensation issues. The first
area of education should be the company’s own plans and policies.
General education about executive compensation can come from a
variety of sources, including director institutes, compensation
153
consultants and legal counsel.

Another executive compensation practitioner summarized similar
views regarding education of compensation committee members as
follows:
A compensation committee can make “informed” decisions only if the
committee members have adequate background and knowledge with
respect to the matters under the committee’s consideration. While
outside advisors can be relied upon for their technical expertise,
committee members, who bear the decisionmaking responsibility, must
be sufficiently conversant with compensation concepts, techniques and
requirements to be able to determine for themselves the merits of all
proposed actions. There are many resources available for director
education in general and compensation committee education in
particular. For example, the Conference Board created a directors’
institute to provide corporate governance education for directors
serving on the boards of U.S. corporations. This program provides
professional educational programs for corporate board members,
dealing with a wide range of important board issues, including
compensation. Also, both the NYSE and Nasdaq have announced
154
programs to provide education for directors of listed companies.

Providing continuing professional education to compensation
committee members will help reduce the effects of several of the
organizational behavior factors identified in Subpart II.C. For example, it
will help directors avoid the social cascades dynamic whereby directors
blindly follow the recommendations of the compensation committee’s
consultant, legal advisor, or chairperson because they lack sufficient
155
information to make their own judgments about difficult decisions.
Education would decrease the tendency of groups to defer to one
member who is perceived as being better informed, and counteract
153. Steven D. Kittrell & James P. McElligott Jr., Avoid the Disney Trap, in Focus on Executive
Compensation 9–10 (2005).
154. Wood, supra note 133, at 14; see Press Release, N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Euronext
Announces Plan to Launch Board Education Program (Mar. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.nyse.com/press/1299669253730.html (noting that “[o]ur goal is to prepare company boards
for the current governance environment in which investor groups and others have been successfully
calling for more accountability and transparency in the boardroom,” using “conferences, events,
publications, and online resources”).
155. See supra Subpart II.C.2.
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156

groupthink and herding. Educating directors will empower them to
formulate and ask tough questions about all compensation proposals and
advice presented by their advisors, and to revise those proposals as
appropriate.
Although it is certainly appropriate and necessary for directors to
seek advice and counsel, they will be better able to “come to the table”
prepared to ask the right questions of their advisors if they have the
requisite training and continuing education. Ultimately, although
compensation committee members can receive excellent guidance from
legal counsel and compensation consultants, the committee members are
responsible for approving executive compensation packages.
Some compensation committee members might understandably not
want to invest time and resources in professional education. They are
very busy, and the number of hours that directors are expected to spend
157
on board service has risen to an average of 225 hours per year.
However, director education is becoming increasingly popular. In fact, a
recent survey of public companies indicates that “[a]pproximately two
companies out of 10 require their board members to attend some type of
continuing education programs to remain abreast of regulatory and
158
compliance developments.” Moreover, such education might help to
insulate directors from liability because being well-informed before
making business decisions is a requirement for reliance on the business
159
judgment rule.
Furthermore, several changes in the governance landscape make
continuing education a wise investment of time for directors. For
example, compensation decisions have come under increased scrutiny
due to public outrage over high amounts of pay and the embarrassment
of negative say-on-pay votes. Further, directors risk losing their board
seats due to “withhold campaigns” (i.e., shareholder attempts to
withhold votes needed to reelect directors) if the compensation packages
they approve receive negative say-on-pay votes from a majority of the
company’s shareholders. The majority of companies had positive say-onpay votes in 2012 with substantial shareholder support, and only
160
2.6% (fifty-seven companies) in the Russell 3000 failed. The results for
161
2013 were very similar. However, there have been several highly

156. Id.
157. See Davidoff, supra note 90.
158. Matteo Tonello, The 2013 Director Compensation and Board Practices Report, Harv. L. Sch.
F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. Blog (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:21 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2013/02/26/the-2013-director-compensation-and-board-practices-report.
159. Lewis H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standards of Review in Conflict Transactions on
Motions to Dismiss: Lessons Learned in the Past Decade, 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 967, 972–73 (2011).
160. Semler Brossy, 2012 Say on Pay Results: Russell 3000 Shareholder Voting 1 (2012).
161. Semler Brossy, 2013 Say on Pay Results: Russell 3000 Say On Pay Results 1 (2014)
(noting that fifty-seven of 2250 companies failed).
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publicized instances in which shareholders have issued failing say-on-pay
votes. For example, Oracle failed its say-on-pay vote with only forty-one
percent shareholder approval in 2012, and only forty-three percent
162
approval in 2013. And shareholders are voting more negatively in the
United States than in the United Kingdom, where they have historically
163
been more reluctant to cast negative say-on-pay votes.
Moreover, shareholders have filed shareholder derivative lawsuits
against several of the companies in the United States that received
negative say-on-pay votes. The lawsuits, which are against the companies
as well as their directors and compensation consultants, allege corporate
waste, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duties, and other charges,
due to the compensation arrangements that the directors approved.
However, plaintiffs have faced significant obstacles in recent executive
compensation lawsuits; indeed the cases typically do not progress beyond
164
the demand stage. This is partially because Dodd-Frank expressly
provides that the say-on-pay vote “may not be construed—(1) as
overruling a decision of such issuer or board of directors; [or] (2) to
create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer or board
165
of directors”—as mentioned in Part I.C.
In addition to equipping directors to deal with increased
shareholder oversight, continuing education also has the added benefit of
166
increasing director primacy. Some scholars have argued that say-onpay and other reforms inappropriately shift the locus of decision-making
authority from directors to activist shareholders in a way that “seems
likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation
practicable; namely, the vesting of ‘authoritative control’ in the board of

162. Id.; see Semler Brossy, Update: Oracle Fails Say on Pay with 41% Support, Say on Pay
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.semlerbrossy.com/sop/update-oracle-fails-say-on-pay-with-41-support.
163. See, e.g., Thomas et al., supra note 6, at 1230 (citing Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”:
Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 Harv. J. on Legis.
323, 341 (2009) (explaining that “shareholders invariably approve the Directors Remuneration
Report, with perhaps eight turndowns across thousands of votes over a six-year experience”)).
164. See, e.g., Kyoko Takahashi Lin & Lawrence Portnoy, Say-on-Pay Litigation Update,
DavisPolk
Briefing:
Governance
(Sep. 5,
2012),
http://www.davispolk.com/briefing/
corporategovernance/61662 (“These cases, decided by federal courts applying Delaware law,
contribute to a line of cases holding that a failed shareholder say-on-pay vote alone does not rebut the
business judgment rule presumption afforded to a board[’s] decisions, including in the realm of
executive compensation.”).
165. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376, § 951(c) (2010). But see Thomas & Wells, supra note 76, at 849 (“[R]ecent Delaware court decisions
have given new life to officers’ fiduciary duties, not only by establishing that officers are bound by the
same fiduciary duties as are directors, but by finding that officers’ fiduciary duty of loyalty has special
application when those officers are negotiating their own compensation agreements.”) (emphasis added).
166. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 550 (2003) (noting that the director primacy theory asserts that
“[n]either shareholders nor managers control corporations—boards of directors do”).
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directors.” Empowering directors with continuing education will help
shift the locus of decisionmaking authority back to the directors. In
addition, companies must now disclose the “experience, qualifications,
168
attributes or skills” of all board nominees and directors every year.
Yet, Dodd-Frank imposes additional responsibilities on directors without
169
regard to whether directors have the expertise to carry out the duties.
The education requirement proposed in this Article will help companies
satisfy the director expertise disclosure requirement.
Moreover, both executive compensation law and accounting rules
have become more sophisticated and complex in the past decade due to
170
For example, in the case of executive
increased regulation.
compensation laws, complicated tax rules such as section 409A of the
171
Internal Revenue Code (which deals with deferred compensation), and
172
extensive SEC disclosure rules under Item 402 of Regulation S-K have
made executive compensation a more technically challenging field than it
was a decade ago. Although compensation committee members would
certainly not be expected to have the same level of knowledge as their
legal advisors and compensation consultants, they could attend
continuing education sessions to stay abreast of compensation issues. For
example, they could attend trainings on nuances such as (1) the levels
and types of executive compensation that are considered “market;”
(2) poor pay practices (such as single-trigger change in control bonus
provisions) that might result in negative say-on-pay votes; (3) the pros
and cons, from human resources, legal, and accounting standpoints, of
granting various equity awards such as stock options, restricted stock,
and/or restricted stock units; and (4) the tax implications of awarding
various equity awards or deferred compensation.
Furthermore, the proposed continuing education recommendation is
similar to a post-Enron American Bar Association (the “ABA”)
recommendation that has not been sufficiently explored by scholars.
However, the ABA recommendation is merely a best practices suggestion,
whereas this Article advocates a mandatory education program. In 2002,

167. Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 46 (noting that in public companies, meaningful shareholder
involvement is difficult due to collective action problems: disperse “[s]hareholders have neither the
information nor the incentives to make sound decisions on either operational or policy questions”).
However, institutional shareholders such as unions and public employee pension funds find say-on-pay
appealing, and their interests often vary from average shareholders. Id. at 47.
168. Fairfax, supra note 118, at 1715.
169. Id. at 1718.
170. The Author has practiced law as an executive compensation lawyer for most of the past
decade, and formerly worked as a Certified Public Accountant.
171. I.R.C. § 409A (2012).
172. Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975—Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2012)
[hereinafter Regulation S-K].
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the Enron bankruptcy prompted the ABA to appoint a Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility to examine systemic corporate governance
173
issues. The Task Force’s Preliminary Report suggested certain reforms
that should be imposed on public companies on a mandatory basis, and
other principles that boards should adopt as a matter of best practices of
174
corporate governance. One of the best practices that the task force
advocated was that public companies should:
Institute and maintain a training and education program for all
directors, and particularly independent directors, in regard to (a) their
legal and ethical responsibilities as directors, (b) the financial
condition, the principal operating risks and the performance factors
materially important to the business of the corporation and (c) the
operation, significance and effects of compensation incentive programs
175
and related party transactions.

b. Comparative Law Considerations
In addition to being consistent with the ABA’s recommendation for
U.S. public companies, the proposed continuing education
recommendation is consistent with international corporate governance
trends. In recent years, several European countries have adopted
requirements or recommendations that their remuneration committees
(the term often used in Europe for compensation committees) have
compensation knowledge or experience. In 2009, the European
Commission issued a recommendation on remuneration policy that
included a proposal (the “EC Recommendation”) that “[a]t least one of
the members of the remuneration committee should have knowledge of
176
Although
and experience in the field of remuneration policy.”
European Commission Recommendations are not binding on Member
States of the European Union, some Member States have decided to
177
follow the EC Recommendation. Six (twenty-two percent) of the
twenty-seven Member States have endorsed the EC Recommendation,
twenty (seventy-four percent) have not endorsed it (or did so to a lesser
extent than originally proposed), and one (four percent) did not provide
178
data. The six Member States that endorsed the EC Recommendation

173. James H. Cheek, III et al., Preliminary Report Of The American Bar Association Task Force
On Corporate Responsibility, 54 Mercer L. Rev. 789, 790 (2003).
174. Id. at 805.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Commission Recommendation (EC) No. 385/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 120) 28, 31.
177. Report on the Application by Member States of the EU of the Commission 2009/385/EC
Recommendation (2009 Recommendation on Directors’ Remuneration) complementing
Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as Regards the Regime for the Remuneration of
Directors of Listed Companies, at 6, COM (2010) 285 final (May 2, 2010).
178. Report on the Application by Member States of the EU of the Commission 2009/385/EC
Recommendation (2009 Recommendation on Directors’ Remuneration) Complementing
Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as Regards the Regime for the Remuneration of
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include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia.
One of those six countries (Belgium) adopted it as a mandatory
legislative provision—which is commonly referred to in the European
Union as “hard law”—whereas the other five countries adopted a
“comply or explain” approach—which is commonly referred to as “soft
180
law.” Belgium enacted the law by amending its Belgian Companies
Code to implement several corporate governance changes, including a
requirement that listed companies have a remuneration committee that
(1) is composed of a majority of independent directors and (2) has the
181
necessary expertise in the area of remuneration policy.
Even though twenty Member States did not adopt the EC
Recommendation, seven of them took alternative approaches that are
within the spirit of the EC Recommendation, such as recommending that
all board members have sufficient qualifications to fulfill their respective
182
duties. And in Germany, the German Share Institute (Deutsches
Aktieninstitut, DAI) started a movement in 2010 “for better and
183
continuous education of board members.”
In considering the EC Recommendation, some Member States noted
that a compensation expertise standard like the one adopted by Belgium
184
would be too difficult to define. Indeed, Belgium does not appear to
185
define expertise in its new law. However, the recommendation in this
Directors of Listed Companies, at 15–16, SEC (2010) 670 (June 2, 2010) [hereinafter Report on
Remuneration], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/directors-remun/sec2010-670-2_en.pdf.
179. Id.
180. Id. “Comply or explain” is a “soft law” approach in which companies must either comply or
explain why they chose not to comply. All E.U. jurisdictions have a corporate governance code stating
that listed companies are not required to follow, but they must annually report whether they comply and
explain the reason for any noncompliance. See Kraakman et al., supra note 142, at 67–69.
181. Elke Janssens et al., New Belgian Corporate Governance Act on Remuneration in Listed
Companies,
NautaDutilh
(Apr. 28,
2010),
http://www.newsletter-nautadutilh.com/xzine/
xzine.html?xzine_id=4468&cid=4&aid=12053.
182. Report on Remuneration, supra note 178, at 15–16. For example, (1) Spain, Finland, the
Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia generally recommended that each board member have sufficient
expertise, experience, and/or qualifications to perform to fulfill her duties, (2) Italy recommended that
at least one member of the Remuneration Committee have expertise in finance, and (3) Luxembourg
recommended that the Remuneration Committee have access to the necessary skills and means to
fulfill the role (which could include compensation consultants). Id.
183. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International
Regulation, 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 27 n.145 (2011). For good governance, a “tailored induction program
should be established for all members, and the particular capabilities of individual directors relevant to
their service on the board should be disclosed,” keeping in mind that with independence comes a lack
of firm specific-knowledge. Id. at 27.
184. Report on Remuneration, supra note 178, at 6.
185. Wet tot versterking van het deugdelijk bestuur bij de genoteerde vennootschappen en de
autonome overheidsbedrijven en tot wijziging van de regeling inzake het beroepsverbod in de banken financiële sector [Law Concerning Corporate Governance] of Apr. 6, 2010, Belgisch Staatsblad
[B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Apr. 23, 2010, available at http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/
2010/04/23_1.pdf.
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Article does not rise to the level of proposing that any compensation
committee members of U.S. public companies become “compensation
experts” per se. Rather, the proposal herein is akin to the financial
literacy requirement imposed on all audit committee members, as
opposed to the higher standard of financial expertise required for at least
one audit committee member.
Clearly, there is some level of support globally to follow the education
requirements advocated in this Article. The United States could build on
this momentum to adopt a similar standard, either as “hard law,” as in
Belgium, or “soft law,” as in Austria, Denmark, Lithuania, Portugal, and
Slovenia. Hard law would be preferable because soft law is generally
believed to be less effective for corporate governance purposes. For
example, some companies in the European Union claim to comply with
soft law, but in reality do not follow the spirit of the soft law, or they
186
simply do not report whether or not they have complied. However, if it
proves politically unfeasible to enact these recommendations as hard law
in the United States, then soft law would be an appropriate compromise.
Ultimately, a global norm will probably emerge for continuing education
on compensation committees.
c.

Comparison to Audit Context

In the audit context, financial literacy is determined by each
187
company’s board in its business judgment, whereas financial expertise
is generally based on experience in certain well-defined positions, such as
188
serving as a public accountant, controller, or Chief Financial Officer. In
the compensation context, on the other hand, there are no such welldefined positions, so requiring compensation committee members to
become “experts” might be problematic.
However, if accreditation bodies in the compensation field were to
devise an appropriate certification in the United States, then this might
be an appropriate reform in the future. For example, WorldatWork
Society of Certified Professionals sponsors a Certified Executive

186. Kraakman et al., supra note 142, at 67–69.
187. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.07 (“Each member of the audit committee must be
financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the listed company’s board in its business
judgment, or must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her
appointment to the audit committee. In addition, at least one member of the audit committee must
have accounting or related financial management expertise, as the listed company’s board interprets
such qualification in its business judgment. While the Exchange does not require that a listed
company’s audit committee include a person who satisfies the definition of audit committee financial
expert set out in Item 407(d)(5)(ii) of Regulation S-K, a board may presume that such a person has
accounting or related financial management expertise.” (emphasis added)).
188. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5)(ii) (2012). Public companies must disclose that the
company’s board has determined that the audit committee has at least one financial expert, or explain
why it does not have one. Id.
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Compensation Professional designation and notes that certification
signals that one is an expert in the field, and is intended for professionals
involved in various aspects of executive compensation strategy or
189
administration, including finance, legal, and tax. Certification involves
taking an examination and completing twelve recertification credits every
190
three years. If regulators decide to implement a requirement for
compensation committee expertise, then other certification programs
could be developed that are tailored more directly to the needs of board
members.
2. Rotations
In addition to being subject to mandatory continuing education
requirements, the compensation committee should have a rotation
system. However, due to practical concerns caused by differences in the
number of independent directors on various boards, this proposal should
be a recommended rather than mandatory measure.
a. How Rotations Address Organizational Behavior Issues
Imposing a rotation program would address some of the group
dynamic concerns discussed in Subpart II.C. In particular, studies show
that reciprocity is more likely to occur when groups continue to interact
191
over time, and when groups are small and homogeneous. In the United
States, compensation committees are usually comprised of an average of
only three directors, and the entire board typically averages eleven
192
members in total. In addition, the composition of boards tends to lack
193
diversity of gender, race, or other background. This lack of diversity is
exacerbated when only a subset of the board is involved.
Directors are not currently required by law to rotate or be subject to
term limits or mandatory retirement, so they could remain on the board
and the compensation committee indefinitely, assuming that they are
reelected. Ironically, when rotation off the compensation committee has
occurred in the past, it might have been for perverse reasons. It has been
suggested that members of the compensation committee “who won’t play

189. Certified Executive Compensation Professional, WorldatWork Soc’y of Certified Profs.,
http://www.worldatworksociety.org/society/certification/html/certification-cecp.jsp (last visited Feb. 4,
2014).
190. Frequently Asked Questions About Certification, WorldatWork Soc’y of Certified Profs.,
http://www.worldatworksociety.org/society/certification/html/certification-faq.jsp (last visited Feb. 4,
2014).
191. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 685.
192. Kraakman et al., supra note 142, at 70; see Fairfax, supra note 118, at 1713–14 (“The average
public company board consists of ten directors, a number that has been virtually unchanged for at least
a decade.”)
193. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 110, at 800–04; see also Julia Werdigier, Fund Plans to Invest in
Companies with Women as Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2009, at B7.
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along [with CEO compensation requests] are rotated out to other
194
committees.”
For the reasons described above, compensation committees fit the
profile of groups that are prone to reciprocity: they are small and
195
homogenous, and they continue to interact over time. These factors
196
also contribute to groupthink. Although the size of the committee need
not change, this Article proposes the adoption of a rotation system to
provide a mechanism for “shaking up” static group dynamics, infusing
new perspectives, and minimizing reciprocity and groupthink.
There is admittedly a significant risk that directors who rotate onto
the compensation committee of a particular company will have already
been captured by management of that company if they come from
another position on that company’s board, as opposed to from a different
company’s board, which is an alternative proposal discussed below.
However, there is still some benefit to having a different set of eyes
reviewing and approving the executives’ compensation packages because
each person will assess the packages from her own personal viewpoint and
raise unique questions and concerns. This will alleviate the groupthink
issue discussed in Subpart II.C.2.
197
Further, as Hwang and Kim’s study made clear, the extent to
which an individual director is likely to approve high amounts of
compensation varies based on the extent of her social ties to the CEO. If
a board has directors with varying levels of social ties to the CEO, a
rotation system will help to distribute the directors such that those with
extensive social ties are not always on the compensation committee.
In addition, if the chair of the compensation committee rotates, it
will alleviate the social cascades factor whereby people follow a leader’s
action because they lack information to form their own opinion. Rather
than consistently following the idiosyncratic views of a particular person
who always serves as the compensation committee chair, the compensation
committee will have the opportunity to be led by different individuals.

194. John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 22–23 (2002)
(quoting Sarah Anderson et al., Executive Excess 2001, United for a Fair Economy 1, 4 (2001)
(describing a Fortune magazine study)) (“The process by which corporate boards generally determine
CEO compensation may be largely responsible for the tremendous increases in recent years: ‘In this
market the same person—the executive—sits on both sides of the bargaining table. The nominal
buyer, the corporation, usually makes its purchase through the compensation committee of the board
of directors, which traditionally consists of independent (non-management) directors. The
compensation committee, in turn, relies on compensation information generated by the corporation
itself or by an outside consultant retained by the corporation. In reality, however, the internal
information, and even the conclusions of the consultant are under control of the chief executive.’ It has
been suggested that ‘directors who won’t play along are rotated out to other committees.’ Directors
who do ‘play along’ with CEO compensation requests may breach their duties to shareholders.”).
195. See supra Subpart II.C.2.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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b. Logistical Issues
Setting practical concerns aside, the best approach for the rotation
program would be to impose a term limit for how long a director could
serve on the compensation committee. After a set period of time, she
would rotate to another board committee. If the limited number of
independent directors on a particular board makes this impossible, the
next best approach would be to impose a term limit for the compensation
committee chair. After a set period of time, she would step down as chair
and remain on the committee but allow another committee member to
assume the chairperson role.
This dual approach is ideal because of the structural limitations of
boards; although public companies are required to have a majority of
198
independent directors, boards vary in the extent to which the number of
independent directors exceeds this baseline requirement. The percentage
199
of independent board members has increased in the past decade. In
2012, eighty-four percent of directors on Standard & Poor’s 500 boards
were independent, and the CEO was the only non-independent director
200
on fifty-nine percent of Standard & Poor’s 500 boards. Given these high
percentages of independent directors, the preferred rotation system (in
which directors can only serve on the compensation committee for a fixed
number of years before rotating off it) seems feasible for most public
companies.
However, companies that have only a slight majority of independent
directors would have difficulty implementing a mandatory rotation
program for the members of the compensation committee, especially
because (1) the compensation committee, nominating/corporate
201
governance committee, and audit committee must each have only
independent directors, and (2) audit committee members must also be
financially literate and have one financial expert, such that companies
will need their audit committee members to stay on that committee if
those directors are the only ones who satisfy those requirements. As
such, if a company has only a slight majority of independent directors,

198. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.01 cmts (“Effective boards of directors exercise
independent judgment in carrying out their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of independent
directors will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of
interest.”).
199. Spencer Stuart, 10 Years Later: Sarbanes-Oxley Act Continues to Shape Board
Governance (July 30, 2012) (summarizing data compiled as part of a 2012 Spencer Stuart U.S. Board
Index). The percentage has increased from seventy-nine percent in 2002 to eighty-four percent in 2012
for Standard & Poor’s 500 boards. Id.
200. Id. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 85, at 118 (“Over the last decade, boards have been
getting smaller and more independent. Most boards in large corporations now consist primarily of
independent directors, that is, directors without direct financial or family ties to the corporation.”).
201. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.04(a).
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there might not be enough independent directors on the board to rotate
onto the compensation committee on a regular basis.
But even just having the compensation committee chair rotate could
be helpful. This is because the compensation chair position is considered
by some experts to be the most difficult role to serve on the entire board
of directors because of the inherent tensions and difficulties involved in
202
saying “no” to the CEO.
A rotation period of five years would be appropriate to balance the
need to bring in fresh perspectives with the need to retain institutional
203
knowledge and chemistry within the committee. As explained above,
imposing a maximum length of time for service as a member or
chairperson of the compensation committee would help to alleviate the
social forces that can lead compensation committees to approve high levels
204
of executive pay. At the end of a five-year term of service, the
compensation committee member or chairperson (depending on the
approach adopted by the company) would step down from the role. After
a five-year break, during which the chair could serve on another
committee, she would be permitted to rejoin the compensation committee.
c.

Other Support for Rotations

After Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted in 2002, there were a few calls to
impose rotations on not only audit firm partners (as discussed below),
205
However, those
but also on compensation committee members.
recommendations for compensation committee rotations were never
implemented. It is not clear why this was the case; the literature does not
reflect an extensive or recent discussion of this point. This Article’s
rotation recommendation for compensation committees, though supported
by these earlier recommendations, is more developed and nuanced. It is
framed by scholarly literature and appropriate for the current financial
environment.
Although compensation committee rotations did not end up being
added to Sarbanes-Oxley, the time is finally ripe for this reform. The
reform is more appropriate and timely now because the financial crisis that
206
led to Dodd-Frank was largely related to compensation issues, whereas
the financial crisis that led to Sarbanes-Oxley (such as the Enron and
207
WorldCom scandals) was primarily related to accounting issues.
Furthermore, a compensation committee rotation program would
help to spread the workload among compensation committee members,

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

James F. Reda et al., Compensation Committee Handbook at xi (2d ed. 2001).
See Wood, supra note 133, at 13–14.
See supra Subpart II.C.
See, e.g., Kittrell & McElligott, supra note 153, at 9.
See supra Subpart I.A.
Beecher-Monas, supra note 85, at 129.
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because they would serve only for a fixed term. Compensation committee
members were already meeting more frequently prior to Dodd-Frank
and will probably meet even more frequently now, given that DoddFrank focuses on the compensation committee and places the committee
208
under increased scrutiny. This can result in a significant workload for a
small number of people, as the compensation committee typically only
209
has three members.
As mentioned above, in 2003 the ABA Task Force provided several
recommendations to address systemic corporate governance issues in the
wake of the Enron bankruptcy. One of the best practices recommended
in the Task Force’s Preliminary Report was for boards to “[c]onsider
whether to establish term limits or policies governing rotation of the
chair and membership of the Board of Directors and its Corporate
Governance, Audit and Compensation Committees, and the number of
210
board and committee memberships.”
In addition, some executive compensation practitioners endorsed
periodic rotation of compensation committees shortly after Congress
211
In 2004, for example, an executive
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley.
compensation practitioner advocated for a periodic review of committee
212
He noted that although rotation would infuse the
assignments.
committee with fresh perspectives, it would cause the committee to lose
213
members with knowledge of the company’s compensation practices. In
2005, two other practitioners noted that “[t]rue independence for a
compensation committee may extend beyond the requirements of the
stock exchange rules. . . . Periodic rotation of membership can bring new
214
perspectives.”
Nonetheless, a recent survey of public companies found that “[a]s
the workload and challenges facing board committees increase, member
215
rotation policies remain infrequent.” For example, some boards do not
favor mandatory rotation of committee assignments or chairpersons as a
general matter because the board believes that experience and continuity
are more important than rotation; however, they acknowledge that
216
rotation should occur if it is likely to increase committee performance.
Further, although rotation is not currently required for any board

208. Fairfax, supra note 118, at 1714.
209. Id.
210. Cheek, III et al., supra note 173, at 805.
211. See, e.g., Kittrell & McElligott, supra note 153, at 9.
212. Wood, supra note 133, at 13–14.
213. Id.
214. Kittrell & McElligott, supra note 153, at 9.
215. Tonello, supra note 158.
216. E.g., Corporate Governance Principles, ADP, http://www.adp.com/about-us/corporate-socialresponsibility/governance/corporate-governance-principles.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
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committees, many companies rotate their lead or presiding independent
217
director.
d. Comparative Law Considerations
From a comparative law standpoint, it appears that no other
countries mandate a rotation of board committee members. However,
there are important corporate governance differences that make rotation
less necessary outside the United States. Several countries have a twotier board structure, either on a mandatory basis (e.g., Germany, China,
218
and the Netherlands), or on an optional basis (e.g., France and Italy).
Also, companies in all E.U. jurisdictions can now opt for a corporate
form called the Societas Europaea, which allows either a one-tier board
219
or a two-tier board. The two-tier structure includes (1) a supervisory
board that is entirely composed of independent directors (and, in some
countries, employee and union representatives) and (2) a management
220
board that is entirely composed of executives.
Because the remuneration committee in such countries is a subgroup of the supervisory board, and no executives sit on the supervisory
221
board, they are more insulated from management influence. In the
United States, on the other hand, the majority of the board must be
independent, but the CEO and sometimes other officers typically serve
222
on the board, or at least join board meetings on an informal basis. As
such, concerns about managerial influence are stronger on U.S. boards.
In addition, although the United States has not adopted regulations
linking director independence and board tenure, many countries outside
223
the United States have.

217. Julie Hembrock Daum & David Kimbell, Achieving Greater Independence in the Board
Room, Point of View, 2005, at 25, 31, available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/
pdf/lib/POV_Issue_1_2005.pdf (“While the NACD Blue Ribbon Council recommends not rotating the
role of the lead and presiding director, we found rotation to be a common practice, particularly among
boards with a presiding director. More than half of the surveyed companies with presiding directors
rotate the role versus just one-third of companies with lead directors.”).
218. Kraakman et al., supra note 142, at 57 n.6 (“For France see Art. L. 225-57 Code de
commerce. For Italy see Art. 2409-8 to 2409-15 Civil Code. For the SE, see Art. 38 Council Regulation
(EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 Oct. 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1.”).
219. Id. at 56–57.
220. Id.
221. However, “the extent of the distinction between the board structures is often unclear.
Informal leadership coalitions can cross-cut the legal separation between management and supervisory
boards [e.g., in German companies with no controlling shareholder, the management board often picks
the supervisory board]; while supermajorities of independent directors and an independent chairman
can give single-tier boards a quasi-supervisory flavor. . . . [L]abor codetermination in Germany, the
most prominent two-tier jurisdiction, weakens the supervisory board as a governance organ devoted
exclusively to the interests of the shareholder class.” Id. at 57–58.
222. See Stuart, supra note 199; see also discussion supra Subpart II.C.2.
223. Romanchek and Keckley, supra note 96 (noting that “In Hong Kong and Singapore, a
company must disclose reasons why it believes a director should still be considered independent after

Grant_21 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete)

April 2014]

INDEPENDENT YET CAPTURED

e.

4/9/2014 4:37 PM

803

Diversity

If companies adopt a rotation system in the United States, then they
should keep diversity of backgrounds in mind. For a mandatory rotation
system to be as effective as possible, it will be important for the board to
consider having a diverse pool of candidates from varied backgrounds
when any new directors are selected to join the board, rather than using a
limited pool of candidates based on personal connections. If replacement
directors are in the same social circle as, or are friends with, the CEO, the
224
ability of the director to avoid groupthink will, of course, be diminished.
In addition to diversity of personal and professional backgrounds,
there is extensive literature regarding the importance of gender and
225
racial diversity in board membership. Moreover, recent SEC rules
require disclosure of the role of diversity in selecting board members,
and the SEC has voiced concerns about lack of diversity on boards and
226
lack of compliance in companies’ reporting of board diversity. The
SEC requires disclosure of whether, and if so how, a nominating
committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying nominees for
227
directors. The SEC did not define diversity, but recognized that some
companies include only gender, race, and national origin as diversity
considerations, whereas other companies have a more expansive view of
diversity that includes different viewpoints, professional backgrounds,
228
education, skill, and other individual qualities.
A recent survey of public companies reveals that “[a]ccording to the
director nomination policy of large companies, diversity matters as much
as business skills. Yet, aside from some level of female representation,
229
corporate boards remain remarkably uniform.” In the case of smaller
public companies, this could be because “[m]ost smaller companies save
board search firm fees and use personal connections to recruit new
230
director nominees.”

serving more than nine years on the board. Similar rules requiring companies to provide ‘sufficient and
clear’ justification are in place for directors serving more than nine years on boards in Ireland, Italy,
and the United Kingdom. And in most of Europe, regulations have been passed that automatically
deem a director to not be independent after serving more than 12 years on the board”).
224. See Dorff, supra note 97, at 2078 (noting that constructing diverse groups may combat
groupthink, but that the empirical data on this is mixed).
225. See supra Subpart II.C.2. See generally Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, A Comparison of Gender
Diversity in the Corporate Governance Codes of France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom (Apr. 6, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Erasmus University
Rotterdam, the Netherlands), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585280.
226. Comm’r Luis A. Aguilar, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Speech by SEC Commissioner: An
Update on Diversity and Financial Literacy (Apr. 30, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch043011laa.htm).
227. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 240, 249, 274 (2009).
228. Id.
229. Tonello, supra note 158.
230. Id.
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Some might ask why diversity is not enough to solve the problems
identified in this Article. Why should boards have to implement
education and rotation requirements when they can simply have more
women and minorities on the board in order to reduce homogeneity and
the risk of groupthink? One response is that if the diverse candidates
share the same educational and professional backgrounds and the same
social ties as the CEO, they too are still susceptible to managerial
influence. Increased diversity is helpful, but not sufficient, in responding
to the problem.
Beyond encouraging diversity, it is not practical to legislate that
members can have no prior relationships with a CEO, for the reasons
discussed above, including the difficulty measuring personal relationships.
However, it is advisable for the nature and extent of any such relationships
to be considered when appointing nominally independent directors,
231
especially if they will serve on the compensation committee.
f.

Comparison to Audit Context

Although listing standards do not currently require rotation of
directors or committee members, Congress has embraced rotations as a
mechanism to preserve independence in other contexts. Rotation
requirements apply to the independent auditors that report to the audit
committee. Specifically, section 203 of Sarbanes-Oxley made it “unlawful
for a registered public accounting firm to provide audit services to an
issuer if the lead (or coordinating) audit partner (having primary
responsibility for the audit), or the audit partner responsible for
reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for that issuer in each
232
of the 5 previous fiscal years of that issuer.” This rule, enacted after the
Enron bankruptcy, was intended to improve the independence of
independent auditors.
In addition, the NYSE Listed Company Manual indicates that the
audit committee should not only ensure the regular rotation of the lead
audit partner as required by law, but also “should further consider
whether, in order to assure continuing auditor independence, there
233
should be regular rotation of the audit firm itself.” Further to that
suggestion, regulatory agencies in the United States and the European
Union recently considered expanding the mandatory rotation
requirement to require the audit firm itself—rather than just the audit
234
partners—to rotate. After extensive consideration by scholars and

231. See Wood, supra note 133, at 10.
232. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2013).
233. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.07(b)(iii)(A) (emphasis added).
234. See, e.g., Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, Concept
Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation 2 (2011). “The PCAOB is a nonprofit
corporation established by Congress [in connection with Sarbanes-Oxley] to oversee the audits of
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practitioners of the pros and cons of that proposal, it was not adopted.
Indeed, from a global perspective, rotation of the lead audit partner “is
now rather common, while external rotation (of the firm) is highly
235
controversial and rarely mandated.” Yet, this recent debate shows that
the concept of rotations is still a hot topic in the corporate governance
field. Moreover, some of the arguments for and against the proposal are
relevant to the question of whether compensation committee members
should rotate.
Various experts weighed in on the audit firm rotation proposal. For
example, a joint team of accounting/finance professors and practitioners
determined that although “[e]nhancing perceived and actual auditor
independence is a worthy objective for public policy. . . . [M]andating
audit firm rotation would be a bad policy. Indeed, such a change may
impair auditor independence, weaken audit expertise and undermine
236
corporate governance.”
However, some of the concerns that led to rejection of audit firm
rotations are not present in the compensation committee rotation context.
Most significantly, experts noted that “a policy of mandatory auditor
rotation could undermine accretion of expertise and impair audit quality”
because auditors are most vulnerable to missing fraud in new
237
engagements, and accounting quality increases with auditor tenure. Such
concerns do not exist in the compensation committee context, though,
because the role of the compensation committee is to design and approve
executive compensation rather than to detect fraud and perform audits.
Furthermore, experts were also concerned that auditor independence
would be undermined because audit firms would engage in “beauty
contests” every few years to solicit new business, which would lead to
238
bidding wars, solicitous relationship building, and opinion shopping.
Again, that concern does not apply to directors who are merely switching
roles on the board. This concern would be more troubling and apropos if
one were to propose rotation of the compensation consultants that advise
compensation committees.

public companies in order to protect investors and the public interest by promoting informative,
accurate, and independent audit reports.” About the PCAOB, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
235. Hopt, supra note 183, at 63 n.361 (noting that in Austria, rotation of the audit firm “was
introduced by law, but then abolished before the law came into force”).
236. See, e.g., Tracey C. Ball et al., Audit Firm Rotation: A Joint Academic and Practitioner
Perspective 1 (Jan. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/
shyamsunder/Research/Accounting%20and%20Control/Presentations%20and%20Working%20Pape
rs/AuditFirmRotation/Audit_Firm_Rotation_%20Dec30_Jamal.pdf (summarizing the findings of a
joint team of accounting/finance practitioners and professors).
237. Id. at 2 (citing various studies).
238. Id.
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In addition, a recent academic study found that the concentration of
the audit market in only four large international firms would make it
difficult for mandatory audit firm rotation to bring about the desired
239
“fresh look.” Admittedly, similar concerns exist for rotation of existing
board members, if all of the directors have already become subject to
managerial influence. However, once again, this concern would be more
pertinent if compensation consultants were required to rotate, because
the compensation consulting industry, like the audit industry, is
240
dominated by a few major players.
g. Counterarguments and Alternative Proposals
In evaluating the proposals in this Article, critics might argue that
there is not much evidence that rotations and expertise actually help
boards be more effective. For example, in the auditing context, the
expertise and rotation requirements have been in place since 2002, yet
corporations have continued to engage in accounting fraud—the 2010
Lehman scandal is a prominent example. Of course, it is possible (but
difficult to prove) that such accounting fraud might have reached an even
higher level if these reforms had not been in place. Ultimately, it is
difficult to prove empirically that rotations and expertise are effective
because once the requirements are put in place there is no control group
against which to compare companies that implemented the requirements.
Critics might also argue that this recommended approach is too
indirect in achieving its goal of augmenting compensation committee
independence because it does not directly change the definition of
independence; they might question the “fit” between the problem and
the proposed reform. Certainly, a reform in which directors are prohibited
from having social ties to the CEO would eliminate the issue. However, as
discussed above, it is not practical to change the definition of
independence in a way that directly addresses the issue of personal
relationships.
Another approach with a more direct fit to the problem would be
for boards to have so-called “professional independent directors” who
serve set terms of perhaps five to seven years on several corporate

239. Id. (“Most large clients already receive one service or another from every one of the four
firms. If one of these accounting firms audits the client, the other three often provide it a host of
advisory services in tax, valuations etc. This perpetual engagement and pre-existing relationships
between most large companies and all four major audit firms implies that there is only limited
opportunity for mandatory rotation to bring about a ‘fresh look.’”).
240. See, e.g., Robin Ferracone, When Familiarity Breeds Complacency: Factors to Consider When
Selecting a Compensation Consultant, Forbes (Feb. 9, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
robinferracone/2011/02/09/when-familiarity-breeds-complacency-factors-to-consider-when-selecting-acompensation-consultant (noting that three of the top five compensation consulting firms are
integrated firms that offer a variety of services, primarily to management).

Grant_21 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete)

April 2014]

4/9/2014 4:37 PM

INDEPENDENT YET CAPTURED

807
241

boards, and then rotate to different companies’ boards. Some scholars
242
advocate that approach. One advantage of that approach is that
because the directors who rotate onto a company’s board will come from
another company’s board, it decreases the concern that such directors
have been captured by management of the new company on whose
board they serve. However, this approach is generally viewed as a radical
and controversial type of corporate director rotation that has gained little
243
support. The recommendations in this Article are a creative yet
practical approach to indirectly achieve the goal of enhancing the
independent judgment of the compensation committee members. These
recommendations are less radical, and thus more likely to be adopted,
than the professional independent director approach.
In addition, critics might argue that the two recommendations in this
Article work against each other because after equipping themselves with
compensation-related knowledge, the compensation committee members
would eventually be required to rotate off the compensation committee.
However, the committee member will have a five-year period during
which to use the knowledge she learns. Using a five-year period decreases
concerns that would arise if the rotation cycle were more frequent.
Moreover, the rotations could occur on a staggered basis, such that all
directors would not rotate off the committee at the same time. This
seems like a reasonable compromise because the benefits of periodic and
staggered rotation after an extended period of time would outweigh any
loss of expertise.
As an alternative, if the rotation proposal recommended in this
Article is not implemented, compensation committees should consider
adopting the best practice of having alternating members of the committee
raise critical questions during board deliberations in a “designated
244
naysayer” capacity. For example, the United Kingdom, in its corporate
governance code, encourages non-executive directors to “constructively

241. See, e.g., William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for
Trillions by Corporate Insiders: The Rise of the New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin.
69, 107–08 (2002). Such directors would need to meet certain qualification requirements, and “could
apply to sit on specific boards but would be assigned by the SEC.” Id. at 107. They “would be required
to report any suspected legal violation to corporate counsel and—absent satisfactory action—to the
SEC.” Id. This arguably would improve corporate governance because “[a]fter all, who would deal
drugs if the ‘narc’ was sitting in the room?” Id. at 108.
242. See, e.g., Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New
Corporate Czar?, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1713, 1741 (2007).
243. See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen, The Case for Professional Corporate Boards, Brookings (Dec. 5,
2010), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/12/05-professional-boards-pozen (proposing a
professional independent board model but acknowledging that even if various concerns are satisfied,
“it will take extraordinary efforts to persuade a company to adopt the new board model”).
244. See Dorff, supra note 97, at 2075 (noting that having half of a group play Devil’s Advocate
can be helpful for introducing conflict).
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challenge” strategy proposals and scrutinize management’s performance.
This can help stimulate discussion of alternative viewpoints and reduce
the risk of groupthink. In several corporate failures, the failure of the
board to ask critical questions or to consider alternative viewpoints
246
helped lead to corporate failure. Although the designated naysayer
approach might not be as effective as having an entirely different person
join the compensation committee or assume the committee chair, it
would be somewhat helpful in achieving the spirit of a rotation system.

Conclusion
The compensation committee independence requirement in DoddFrank is not sufficient to achieve its goal of making compensation
committee members independent of management because it does not take
into account relevant insights from organizational behavior literature
regarding group dynamics. Those insights indicate that nominally
independent directors might still be subject to psychological pressures
that lead them to approve excessive amounts of compensation for the
management of the company on whose board they serve. Due to the
difficulties of incorporating personal relationships into the independence
standards, this Article proposes an alternative approach for lessening the
extent to which independent directors might become subject to managerial
influence. This approach includes two reforms for compensation
committees: (1) mandatory continuing professional education and (2) an
optional rotation system. Regulators and/or companies should consider
implementing these proposals to augment the reforms instituted under
Dodd-Frank.
Although say-on-pay has already resulted in several cases in which
the majority of shareholders of U.S. public companies cast negative votes
on compensation, such votes are of limited effect due to their advisory
and ex post nature—they are non-binding votes on compensation
decisions that have already been approved by compensation committees.
Making structural changes to the compensation committee, as advocated
in this Article, is an ex ante approach that can supplement the ex post
say-on-pay vote.
The recommendations endorsed in this Article are likely to make
the reforms that have already been enacted more effective. While the
reforms in Dodd-Frank are appropriate and well-intended, they do not
go far enough to address one of the underlying causes of inappropriate
executive compensation decisions: social dynamics coupled with long
tenure and a lack of compensation expertise within the compensation

245. Fin. Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code § A.4 (2012).
246. Davidoff, supra note 90.
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committee. Those factors make it difficult for compensation committee
members to say “no” to CEOs.
By empowering shareholders to say “no,” say-on-pay has begun to
empower compensation committees to say “no” too because the committee
members want to avoid negative say-on-pay votes and the associated
negative ramifications. In a similar manner, rotations and continuing
education are additional tools that can empower compensation committee
members to be more effective directors. Although these tools might at
first appear to be burdens on compensation committee members, they
can ultimately be helpful tools that empower compensation committee
members and enable them to fulfill their duties on the board. Ultimately,
the recommendations in this Article, along with the other reforms that
have already been implemented under Dodd-Frank, might help to prevent
future financial crises.
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